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Abstract
This essay begins with two assumptions, and throughout tries to remain honest to
them. First, that the Discipline of Western Philosophy, and pedagogy too, have
certain intrinsic values. And second, that when a philosophy professor teaches,
their teaching should be informed by the values of philosophy and the research
that has been done on pedagogy. It would be somewhat strange, after all, if
philosophy were taught unphilosophically or unpedagogically. Those are my
assumptions. This paper is dedicated toward answering what the values of Western
Philosophy are, how current practices break them, and what a philosophy class
would look like if it were philosophically and pedagogically inspired. This paper
is both critical and constructive: it critiques how philosophy is generally taught,
and constructs an alternative. My goal, this essay’s goal, is to convince its reader
that the proposed alternative is valuable — an improvement upon how things stand
today, both because of its philosophical roots and pedagogical acuity.
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Chapter I: Justifying The Investigation

Essential Terms
This essay investigates the shortcomings and successes of philosophy as currently
taught within United States universities. I call this the pedagogy of academic
philosophy. It is distinguishable from the discipline of Western philosophy, which
is the subject being taught through the pedagogy. It is also distinguishable from
the broader discipline of philosophy in general, which can be thought to
encompass all philosophical movements and their contents (granting that they be
acknowledged as philosophic in some sense and by some people).
What is most important to this investigation is developing an adequate
description of the pedagogy of academic philosophy as it stands here and now (the
early 21st century). Once the aims and actual state of this movement have been
determined, one attains a critical leverage sufficient to improve it. One can then
assess whether the state of this pedagogy has fulfilled the aims which define it.
But what are these aims? If one were to grant that the pedagogy of academic
philosophy is an extension of the discipline of Western philosophy, a solution
appears: the former would likely be answerable to the purposes of its discipline.
The values of Western philosophy become the values of its pedagogy. This, of
course, is something granted by many academic practitioners, and often without a
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second thought.1 Such an assumption says no more than that universities within
the United States have established their philosophy programs on the basis of
values and content derived from the Western canon of philosophy; and so long as
these programs continue to laud the Western canon as a highly successful, highly
respectable mode of philosophizing, there would be something strange about their
turning around and teaching counter to the values this mode would entail.
Following this line of reasoning, one may notice that an additional criterion
is needed for the pedagogy of academic philosophy to fulfill its design. More than
being answerable only to the standards of Western philosophy, this pedagogy is
also answerable to broad pedagogical standards which ought to inform teaching
everywhere. In a practical sense, this means that new discoveries in pedagogical
method should be applied to the teaching of academic philosophy, at least where
they are consistent with the aims of Western philosophy proper. Things may
become more complicated if the conclusions of pedagogical research and the aims
of Western philosophy differ. Be that as it may, the tension that comes from
compromising between two demands is no reason to deny that both demands hold.
The pedagogy of academic philosophy ought to be both pedagogically and
philosophically rigorous. Two terms, therefore, must be defined before any critical

1

The prefaces to most purportedly comprehensive readers within philosophy define the subject as
arising out of, and perennially returning to, the problems first put forward by Ancient Greek
thinkers. Often implied in such statements is the respect for essential characteristics of the
Greek’s methodology as well, most recognizable is the importance of reason to philosophical
thought. For instances of this, see The Basics of Western Philosophy (Eugene Kelly), Classics of
Philosophy (Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn), Western Philosophy, an Anthology (John
Cottingham) and so on.
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or constructive perspective on the pedagogy of academic philosophy can be
offered: the discipline of Western philosophy, and the current state of pedagogical
theory. What are their values?

Defining the Discipline of Western Philosophy:
To define Western philosophy, I rely primarily on Eugene Kelly’s The Basics of
Western Philosophy, supplementing his definition when needed with the
introduction to John Cottingham’s Western Philosophy, an Anthology, Sir
Anthony Kenny’s Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy, and the
works of philosophers notoriously canonized within the tradition. I choose these
sources not because they represent the final word on Western theory, nor because I
believe them to offer a more reliable definition than their alternatives.2 Rather, I
choose Kelly, Cottingham and Kenny out of respect for those who may be
skeptical of this essay’s intention: to critically assess the pedagogy of academic
philosophy. Those who would prefer a more inclusive approach towards defining
the discipline of Western philosophy are likely convinced already that its
pedagogical practices are due for a shift. In contrast, those who would prefer that
the roots of Western philosophy remain conclusively Greek,3 that logic continue to

2

Of which there are many. See The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Philosophy, which illuminates
the role played by women in the development of the Western canon; see also “African Philosophy
in Comparison with Western Philosophy,” in which the latter is defined in terms of its ability to
accommodate contradictory viewpoints.
3
As opposed to accentuating the Muslim influence of Greek rediscovery and interpretation,
particularly in regards to Averoes and Avicenna.
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operate strictly according to the dictates of reason,4 and that the philosophically
trained retain epistemological privilege,5 are those to whom this essay must also
project itself. To derive a collection of shortcomings within the pedagogy of
academic philosophy from Kelly, a philosopher whose anthology cements these
very claims, would reveal that traditional perspectives on philosophy nonetheless
yield dynamic conclusions. In other words, it would prove that within the desire to
preserve Western philosophy’s essence, a conservative task, is the latent necessity
to alter current pedagogical practice, a progressive conclusion. One need not adopt
any revolutionary premises in order to follow the logical structure of this essay.
To answer the question of what premises are to be adopted in the definition
of the discipline of Western philosophy, Eugene Kelly takes the lead. What
characterizes the historical beginnings of Western theory is an intuition: the
suspicion that I “may not know what I think I know” (Kelly 4). Most notably
reminiscent of Socrates, though also of Descartes some millenia later, Kelly
asserts that this “uncertainty” and “inspiration” is definitive of the tradition (4).

As opposed to a logic inclusive of “emotionality, bodiliness, animality, and particularity” (see
“The Politics of Reason, Towards a Feminist Logic,” Val Plumwood, 437). A common point of
advocacy for feminist philosophers within the Western canon since at least the 1950s has been a
revision of logic’s definition, something historically defined by men, and, in the case of Plato,
Aristotle, and Kant, recognized to be explicitly exclusive of women.
5
A person or population is epistemologically privileged when their judgments are sought out and
esteemed within systems of power, especially in comparison to other groups. People with
philosophy degrees are epistemologically privileged insofar as they are trusted to make correct
philosophic judgments without input from the populations about which their judgments are made.
One alternative is to epistemologically privilege the oppressed perspective, insofar as this
perspective is generally absent from academic discourse, and, for that reason, provides the
greatest opportunity to falsify, and thereby sharpen, current theory. See In a Different Voice, by
Carol Gilligan, in which this precise phenomenon occurs.
4
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Indeed, it is how “the philosophical adventure begins,” and how it perpetuates
itself (4). From this self-conscious uncertainty comes another of Western
philosophy’s mainstays: that “it must ask about its own nature…explor[ing]
critically the foundations of human practices, such as science, politics, religion, or
morality” — indeed, of any system that aspires to knowledge (5). The spirit of this
pursuit is modeled by Socrates, whose relationship with venerated sources of
wisdom was neither dogmatic in its acceptance nor derision, but rather critical in
its genuine interest. Although this particular aim of philosophy may seem abstract,
with its emphasis on maintaining an initial uncertainty towards claims of
knowledge, the purpose behind this uncertainty is largely practical, particularly
within Western philosophy’s Greco-Medieval roots. From Aristotle and Plato
through to Aquinas and Augustine, esteemed philosophers have held that our
development of reason is essential to concrete decision-making.6 Indeed, Kelly
reminds us that these Greek philosophers were committed to their “conceptual
analysis hav[ing] relevance to one’s efforts to live well and happily” (Kelly, 7).
Cottingham relates this desire to the present by reminding us that “a great
philosophy student will never rest content with knowing what the great
philosophers said,” but rather, will persist in discovering “what issues, if any, they
illuminate” (Cottingham, 29). As represented by Kelly and Cottingham, Western
philosophy sees itself as a process of reasoning, arising out of an emotional

6

See Feminist Ethics and Natural Law, Chapter 3, “Thomas and the Natural Law.”
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reaction to the world (“uncertainty” and “inspiration”), and towards an improved
practical relation with the world (that of happiness, virtue, and contemporary
analysis).
Such a claim becomes only more convincing when additional emotions and
practical relations within the process of philosophizing are examined. Kelly
invokes Plato’s allegory of the cave as broadly descriptive of the intentions of
Western philosophy. He interprets the allegory as asserting that our escape from
ignorance and into truth is benefited by an “emotional attitude: the love of
knowledge for its own sake” (Kelly, 11). This inspiration is strong enough to
provoke our abandoning what was old (the cave), and sturdy enough to endure the
initial confusion of the new (the blinding sunlight beyond). What’s more,
knowledge for its own sake requires some content to be known, content which is
afforded only through a “practical grasp of how things work7” (11). With this in
mind, a love of knowledge for its own sake is completely compatible with
philosophy’s ability to alter one’s practical understandings for the better. This is
because a wider range of practical pursuits provide more content upon which
philosophers may theorize. Once again, reason, best exercised outside the cave, is
made accessible only insofar as our emotions provoke our escape from ignorance,
and, once begun, by our engagement with the practical world. Cottingham

Italics unchanged. This might seem an anti-rationalist perspective, though even Kant’s
transcendental philosophy was premised upon abstracting essential characteristics out of
experience. If the experiential content were off-base, so too would be the rationalist abstraction.
7
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acknowledges the importance of emotional engagement from a pedagogical
perspective, warning that the presentation of philosophy affects whether a
student’s “enthusiasm for making…further efforts will simply ebb away before
any progress has been made,” limiting the field of philosophy from further
development (Cottingham, 16). This perspective on the spirit of Western
philosophy can be expressed in terms of limiting factors — personal attributes
which would frustrate one’s philosophic investigations. An apathetic or lifenegating8 perspective on the world, for instance, would make it difficult to
encourage oneself in the study of it. Similarly, one who sees their work as
abstracted from practical life, action, or praxis, would simultaneously isolate
themself from the content that they mean to study — something introduced by
living actively within the world.
Additionally, there is an element of self-improvement central to the spirit of
the Western canon, something especially salient in Greek and Greco-Medieval
theories of virtue. For Kelly, this is manifest in the way philosophy “demands
autonomy of us” (11). In order to foster the “aptitude and desire” necessary to
escape ignorance, we must recognize ourselves as beings capable of determining
our own pursuits — i.e. as potentially autonomous. The method of philosophizing
preferred within Western tradition relies on this spirit of freedom, at least, insofar
as it requires “each of us…to defend his or her own opinions” when assured of

8

In the “necrophilic” sense, i.e. the desire to oppress life as opposed to affirm and to liberate it.
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their validity (11). Without a spirit of autonomy, this defense would be replaced
with uncritical deference, something Western philosophy has long abhorred.9
Indeed, Cottingham insists that “part of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a
certain critical distance from current doctrines,” assuring us that becoming a
philosopher involves developing an autonomous character. Coeval with its respect
for autonomy is the Western tradition’s insistence on creativity within its pursuits.
Kelly is quick to tell us that “success in this great adventure of autonomous
inquiry does not require so much the transmission of facts, but…the determination
to inquire into what is yet unseen” (11). To begin this creative inquiry requires our
developing a unique worldview, something which Western philosophy, according
to Cottingham, is meant to support.10 One is reminded of Western philosophy’s
recognition of figures like Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, who (all in
various ways) revealed inconsistencies within the systems of their day in order to
direct contemporary thought in unprecedented directions. That the tradition of
Western philosophy considers these figures to be foundational in its selfperception is but another reason to appreciate Kelly’s assessment of Western
theory: that autonomy, creativity, and the development of a worldview, are
qualities true to this tradition’s roots, and, indeed, axiomatic to its perpetuation
and self-renewal.

See Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, or any of the Platonic dialogues.
“Philosophizing is never just about absorbing material; it is about standing back and reflecting
on it. What is more — and this is perhaps unique to philosophy — it is about reflecting on how the
results of your reflections affect your overall worldview” (31).
9

10
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Finally, there is the general method of Western philosophizing left to be
examined. Here I adopt a useful distinction between method and procedure, in
which method is “the theoretical structure” behind philosophic investigation (what
ought to happen), while procedure defines “the practical structure” that has
historically come into being (what does happen).11 In terms of method, the
Western tradition advises a generally communal mode of inquiry. One does not
write a treatise without familiarizing themself with their topic’s history, and this
inevitably involves the creation of a community of philosophers. This normative
prescription is what has allowed Western philosophy to develop its “complex
interplay of arguments” capable of communicating centuries apart from one
another (Cottingham, 15). Descartes, in his Discourse on Method, refers to the
way in which “the reading of all good books is like a conversation with the most
honorable people of all ages,” precisely because these books are meant to
encourage some response from their reader. This academic network, if not
causally linked, is certainly foreshadowed by the ideals of Ancient Greek
philosophizing set forth by Socrates and Plato. Sir Anthony Kenny, in his Oxford
Illustrated History of Western Philosophy, describes how Plato identified “the
human good,” of which philosophy is a part, “as one to be achieved within
community” (33). When placed within the context of the Republic, this may do no
more than support a theory of ‘vertical’ communication whereby the knowing king

11

Feminist Ethics and Natural Law, (140).
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reveals the interests of the otherwise unaware bronze-class12. However, when
understood in the context of Plato’s body of work, inspired as it was by the
historical action of Socrates, a ‘lateral’ form of communication seems more
appropriate. This finds ample support in our historical accounts of Socrates, to
which Plato was indebted: the former declaring during his trial that “whatever the
outcome” he would “go on asking questions and practicing philosophy with each
person he meets” (Kelly, 7). The presence of an interlocutor, willing to enter into
the fray of discussion, and to put their own perspectives on trial, was an integral
part of this method of philosophizing.13 The academic intercommunication of
today, if not encouraging personal conversation, is nonetheless representative of
this method. Every publication is an invitation to Socratically investigate some
claim to knowledge. Cottingham recognizes this aspect of the tradition as well,
eloquently stating how “philosophers conduct their researches in a kind of
perpetual living dialogue with the protagonists of the past” (28). We see, finally, in
the letters of many canonized figures14 a further affirmation of this point — that
these dialogues often exist in the present as well. Theories are honed and perfected
when they are shared with others, whose unique perspectives offer something
difficult to acquire alone.

12

Though, even following this line of interpretation, the ideal apprehension of knowledge remains
that which is expressed in the allegory of the cave: one discovering truth through their own
reflection as inspired by other thoughtful citizens (those who pull their fellows out of the cave).
Plato only doubted that everyone could be so properly thoughtful, by this interpretation, not that
thoughtful practice was isolated from community.
13
Something especially apparent in the Theaetetus.
14
Especially within those of Locke and Hume.
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There is a weaker claim that some may think preferable to the stronger I
have made above: instead of asserting that Western philosophizing is a communal
mode of inquiry, why not state that it could be instantiated as such — that it may
be communal, while also lending itself to isolated study? One might point to
Descartes and his Meditations on First Philosophy as a typical example of
individualized philosophizing. This is where the distinction between method and
procedure becomes useful. The Western tradition self-consciously believes in a
method of sharpening theories through social inquiry, but this does not mean that
those within its purview actually proceed in a communal manner. Within
Descartes’ body of work, though particularly his Discourse on Method, there is a
general distrust of theories “having been composed and enlarged little by little
from the opinions of many different persons,” as they do not “draw nearly so close
to the truth as the simple reasonings that a man of good sense can naturally make
[on his own]” (7-8). Descartes likens this anthological mode of inquiry to the
hiring of many architects in the designing of a single block, or the employment of
many people for the developing of a single codified law — the product would not
represent something willed toward a single end, and would therefore confuse (7).
It is for this reason that in his Meditations, Descartes finds himself “constrained to
try to guide [himself] on [his] own” (10). Descartes’ procedure then, was certainly
individual, but there remains an element of Cartesian philosophy that requires a
more nuanced understanding of method. By disseminating his philosophy through
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the publishing of his works, Descartes believed himself to be fulfilling “the law
that obliges us to procure, as much as is in our power, the common good of all
men,” thereby affirming some criteria of communal responsibility within
philosophy (35). As it stands, this does no more than to support a ‘vertical’ theory
of community (much like within the Republic) in which one knower bestows
knowledge onto a collection of non-knowers. Realization of the “Brevity of life,”
however, and the resulting “lack of [possible] experiments” to be accomplished
within his lifetime, leads Descartes to a more ‘lateral’ conclusion:

“I judged there to be no better remedy against these two obstacles than to
communicate faithfully to the public the entirety of what little I had found
and to urge good minds to try to advance beyond this by contributing each
according to his inclination and ability, to the experiments that must be
performed and also by communicating to the public everything they might
learn, in order that, with subsequent inquirers beginning where their
predecessors had left off, and thus, joining together the lives and labors of
many, we might all advance together much further than a single individual
could do on his own” (36).

This represents a methodological standard definitive of Western philosophy: that
theories are and must be improved through the collective engagement of a
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community of inquirers. While it is true that procedurally speaking, this does not
always occur (as in the case of Descartes), we can still assert it as a general
standard to which our procedures are accountable. What’s more, this social mode
of investigation need not only aim towards historical progress (in which one
isolated philosopher establishes the groundwork for another). Rather, Descartes’
request is also that the public “communicate those experiments they have already
performed and…assist me in the search for those that remain” (37). A discursive
community is encouraged not only for historical, but for contemporaneous
progress within the Western tradition. That Descartes seems to contradict himself
in this belief together with his previous assertion that systematized knowledge was
a single person’s pursuit can be interpreted as a clash between values. Autonomy,
through which one is free to construct what they wish according to their own
organizational desires, and communal inquiry, in which one is accountable to a
larger discourse, do not always seem to compliment one another. Both, though, are
integral to the tradition of Western philosophy. Descartes implicitly acknowledges
the dialectic that exists between these two values, but does not synthesize them.
Neither does this dialectic necessarily need to be synthesized.15 Rather, what is
important is that one recognize its two members (autonomy and communal
inquiry), as equally relevant within the discussion of an academic pedagogy
authentic to the Western tradition.

15

It is not the goal of this paper, at the very least.
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I do not claim to have uncovered a comprehensive set of descriptors for the
tradition of Western philosophy — to stake such a claim as that would require an
independent work in its own right. Rather, I merely make the case that certain
qualities of the tradition, those examined above, have a basic historical backing,
and would themselves require much work to prove unrepresentative of Western
philosophy. Thus, I argue that any pedagogy accountable to Western philosophy
would do well to consider these insights (which, despite all being traditional, are
yet not all equally acknowledged).
That the Western tradition requires our accountability to reason and the
conclusions yielded by reason is common knowledge to all those familiar — but
that there is an historical precedent for considering this reason instigated and
perpetuated by emotional attitudes (skepticism, inspiration, love for what is
studied, and enthusiasm) is less acknowledged.16 This is our first hint that a
pedagogy designed to convey Western philosophy ought to engage its students’
emotions, if for no other reason than that our reason is improved when we feel
inspired to reason.
Similarly, while it would be somewhat superfluous to cite philosophy’s
concern with abstract questions — those unassociated with particular items and
events — the notion that such abstractions have meaning only within the context
of our concrete experience seems forgotten. For example, even Kant’s

16

While this section focuses on the historical definitions of Western philosophy (and therefore
examines precedential claims), an analysis of the reasonability of these claims will follow.
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transcendental philosophy, perhaps the most abstract imaginable, requires our
confirmation that people’s experiences of space, time, and their synthesis be
formally identical. Philosophizing is in this way incumbent upon our practical
relationship with the world — it requires that we ask whether theories accurately
represent our experience, and if not, why not. This is an extension of the notion
forwarded by Kelly that, within the Western tradition, our practical engagement
with the world is what provides us content for philosophizing. Such practical
experience becomes all the more crucial should we acknowledge that this tradition
was built on the assumption that reason could improve our lived experience. Such
descriptions of Western philosophy entail that its pedagogical practice should
engage, rather than alienate, our experience of the practical world.
In the sense that philosophy would cease to be practicable without our
faculties of autonomy and creativity (and indeed that the more rigorously
developed these faculties are, the less our philosophizing might be swayed by
dogma), it is natural to prescribe that any pedagogy of Western philosophy nurture
these characteristics as much as can be. What makes this line of argument all the
more convincing is the history with which such qualities of character have been
praised within the tradition. When properly raised, these traits allow one to
develop those unique worldviews that Cottingham insists are definitive of the
Western tradition. These, too, should be allowed the students of philosophy.
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Finally, as revealed in Descartes’ dialectic, a communal mode of inquiry
equal in importance to general autonomy is necessary for any theory’s proper
development. The pedagogy in question would do well to instil in its students a
respect for cooperative methodologies, and philosophic conclusions which thereby
promise communal representation. This mode of inquiry is recognized (whether
tacitly or no) by the academic enterprise in which papers are publishable only
when they have taken into account the relevant research of fellow academics.
While admittedly incomplete, any definition of the discipline of Western
philosophy ought to include these three things: 1) The recognition that our use of
reason is inescapably linked to certain emotional attitudes that encourage
reasoning, and concrete contextualizations that make sense of reasoning; 2) The
recognition that our faculties of autonomy and creativity allow for the
development of unique worldviews required for philosophy to be interpreted,
critiqued, and improved; 3) The recognition that theories and their critiques are
best pursued communally, insofar as different perspectives sharpen the accuracy
and scope of philosophic theories.

Defining the State of Contemporary Research on Pedagogy:
In order to determine which works to draw upon in assessing the general state of
Western pedagogy, I have chosen to vet potential resources according to two
criteria. First, that the works be academically recognized, and therefore examples
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of Western education’s own self-conscious reflections; and second, that the works
be broad enough in their scope to accommodate use in the context of a philosophic
pedagogy. Following the first criterion, Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed
(Pedagogy) as well as Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojksi’s Towards an Ontology of
Teaching (Towards an Ontology) are established as live-options. In recognition of
the second criterion, these works become ideal options. This is partly because they
are each meant to be practiced generally, in any educational setting, and partly
because both arise out of the tradition of Western philosophy more particularly.
Pedagogy acknowledges itself as indebted to the work of Marx and Hegel, and
Towards an Ontology is intentionally steeped in the theory of Hannah Arendt and
Martin Heidegger. By committing themselves to establishing an academically
recognized, pedagogical theory rooted within the discipline of Western
philosophy, these authors present a more relevant perspective than most other
works of pedagogical research (which limit themselves to particular fields, or
avoid connecting themselves with philosophy generally).
Finally, as live-options, they possess an initial trustworthiness. Their
contents are not to be written-off through titular misgivings, but rather through
studied appraisal and critique. While they themselves have performed such
appraisal on previous pedagogical theories, criticizing teacher-centered, studentcentered, and lecture-based learning, for example, their own theories have met
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with little criticism, instead receiving a telling amount of praise.17 The spot held by
these two works within pedagogical theory is one of contemporaneousness, their
content at once ushering out flawed theories of the past, and ushering in largely
accepted foundations for theories of the present. As live-options, then, they are
preferable to alternatives whose shortcomings are known and publicized. Thus, as
a sample of the current work within pedagogical theory, and as particularly
relevant to philosophy itself, Pedagogy and Towards an Ontology provide a
second set of criteria which any pedagogy of academic philosophy ought to meet
— especially where their demands and the demands of the Western tradition
coincide. The goal of this section now is to summarize the conclusions of
Pedagogy and Towards an Ontology such that a list of criteria for any pedagogical
practice can be established. As with my definition of the discipline of Western
philosophy, this list is not meant to be comprehensive (as this would require
knowledge of future insights as yet unknown) but rather to address what is
currently understood as necessary for such a practice.

For Pedagogy of the Oppressed, see “The ‘Pedagogy of the Oppressed’: The necessity of
dealing with problems in students’ lives.” // “Revisiting Pedagogy of the Oppressed: Paulo Freire
and Contemporary African Studies” // “Teaching with pensive images: rethinking curiosity in Paulo
Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed” // “Peace education: Imagination and the Pedagogy of the
Oppressed.”
For Towards an Ontology of Teaching, see “To the burrow and back again. A review of Towards
an Ontology of Teaching” // “Berstein as an artful teacher,” which, while supplying some criticism,
affirms Vlieghe and Zamojski’s foundational theory of thing-centered learning. // “Teaching at the
margin—Didaktik in the sphere of attention.”
17
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Towards an Ontology: The theory presented within Towards an Ontology makes
especially fervent use of a particular pedagogical premise: that the affirmation, or
the loving recognition of, some ‘thing’ (whether ideological or material) within the
world is a necessary relationship a teacher must hold with their subject-matter (8).
In other words, what is being taught must be conceived by the teacher as worthy
material for the next generation if teaching it is to make sense at all — and not
worthy due exclusively to some instrumental purpose,18 but worthy in and of itself.
Vlieghe and Zamojski use this premise to critique ‘teacher-centered’ education,
and the opposing ‘student-centeredness,’ which seemed to some a proper
replacement for the former. Both, according to the authors, mistake the object of
learning as something foreign to its subject matter, and in this way, cease to affirm
the subject matter as worthy of study. The teacher-centered approach presents the
class’ instructor as “sage on the stage,” the final judge over when a student has
attained knowledge of some ‘thing,’ and what aspects of this ‘thing’ warrant
appraisal in the first place (23). In this way, a teacher-centered approach mistakes
the thing itself for the teacher’s perspective of the thing. The consequence of this
is that the subject matter is objectified by the teacher’s perspective, who is
“imposing [their] already established meanings,” and, being objectified, ceases to
be capable of reinterpretation (56). This is not to say that teachers need not be

18

Studying botany, for instance, should not be seen as justified merely because a knowledge of
the subject-matter allows us to develop medicines and healthy habitats, but also because the
subject-matter of botany represents a cluster of things worthy of inherent respect, like trees,
herbs, shrubs, and their chemical compositions.
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experts in their field, or that students have nothing to gain from an experienced
practitioner. Indeed, the authors make it clear that “it is of greater importance [that
a teacher] be a master in [their] subject matter” than that they have any other skill
(101). Their expertise is important, however, not because they might use it to offer
students ultimate statements about what is true and what is false within their field.
Rather, a teacher’s familiarity with their material has value because it gives them
the power to “show that a subject matter is important and why it is important”
(119, italics in original). Those teachers are exemplary who have studied their
subject out of love for the beauty or value it possesses, and are therefore qualified
to reveal this value and beauty to their students. That they reveal true information
about their subject (or at least, information unlikely to mislead) is important as
well, and this is why no one teacher or collection of teachers should be revered as
a final arbiter of truth. Such teacher-centeredness is a pedagogical problem, but it
is clearly a philosophical problem as well. Following our research into the
Western tradition, it is clear that when a philosophy is no longer capable of
reinterpretation, it becomes dogmatic, and loses any place within philosophical
thought.
Student-centered teaching has been heralded as a potential alternative. By
the standards of Vlieghe and Zomojski, however, it too fails to affirm the value
inherent within a class’ subject matter. This form of teaching generally “give[s]
students the responsibility to take charge over their own education…allow[ing]
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[them] to develop insight and skills on the basis of their own interests and needs”
(23). The role of the teacher in such a system is to “respond to needs and interests
that are already given” within the lives of their students. Among other things, this
tactic ironically stifles the ability of students to transform themselves through
experiences that vary from what they have known, and know to pursue (21). As
might be expected, the subject-matter too is at risk, often becoming lost among
student “monologues…where everything and anything can be said and should be
acknowledged, and where any criterion of truthfulness is absent,” insofar as no
standard exists above all students to affirm or improve their opinions (52). This is
not to say that those aspects of a student’s life which prevent them from studying
some ‘thing’ should go unremedied by the teacher,19 but that for precisely this end
a student should also be encouraged to study the ‘thing’ in question. In other
words, concern over a student’s enjoyment of education should not go so far as to
limit the subject-matter’s substance to what is initially interpreted as capable-ofproviding joy by the student. Similar to teacher-centered models of education, the
student-centered model limits a subject-matter to some single person’s perspective
regarding it. The student is studied, as opposed to the object. From the perspective
of Western philosophy too, a student-centered pedagogy seems inadequate. It is
unfaithful to the standard of communal inquiry, in which diverse perspectives

So say the authors: “It is not our intention to question the validity of a psychological approach
interested in the motivational aspects of and satisfaction levels that come with learning
experiences, [or] of a sociological approach seeking to uncover the societal functions of
education and to disclose to what extent education fulfills these roles or fails to do so” (70).
19
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improve upon each other, as opposed to running past each other, without a
common ground for mutual critique.
Unsurprisingly, the teaching strategy favored by Vlieghe and Zamojksi is
one which is self-consciously ‘thing-centered.’ This form of education requires
that teachers provoke interesse (generally meaning interest) for a subject-matter
within their students, such that these students ‘stay with that thing’ as they study it.
What this means is that studying a ‘thing’ should entail giving that thing authority
over what is or is not its proper description. The thing itself is to be trusted more
than teacher or student. However, an investigation into the technical use of
interesse and ‘to stay with a thing’ is necessary for grasping this definition’s
subtleties. To provoke true interesse means “letting a thing appear on its own
terms, being attuned to it, and exposing oneself to its appeal,” all of which
culminates in what we might call an authentic interest (56). While “to stay with a
thing means…to follow it in its withdrawal to the extent that we give it authority”
(56). Here the ‘withdrawal’ of a subject-matter refers to the way its hidden
complexity becomes salient the more one learns about it. To know more about a
subject matter includes discovering the extent of one’s own ignorance. Thus, to
stay with a thing in the classroom means to recognize that no one (neither teacher
nor student) has attained a comprehensive understanding of the thing’s meaning,
and that the proper response to this realization is refusing to idolize or dogmatize
any one perspective, but rather, to investigate the thing as it exists. To provoke
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interesse, and encourage their students to ‘stay with the thing’ of study, “is exactly
what we mean by thing-centered pedagogy” (56). In its refusal of dogmatism and
relativism, this pedagogical approach possesses an initial affinity with the ideals of
autonomy and communal inquiry so important to Western philosophy. Further, it
is clear that our interesse, related to a thing’s “draw[ing] us towards it,” is an
emotional condition tied to reasoning well, something which Western philosophy
internally acknowledges as beneficial to its study.
In order for a teacher to realize a thing-centered pedagogy within their
classroom, they need to do two kinds of things: 1) embody some particular
attitudes, and 2) present their material in some particular ways. In terms of
attitudes, these teachers must adopt an affirmative perspective towards their
subject-matter, and a perspective of epistemological trust towards their students. In
one sense, to ‘affirm’ one’s subject matter means (simply) externalizing one’s
passion for it in the classroom. It is this passion that functions as “a conduit the
teacher [may use] for creating attention” towards the thing of study, thus
provoking interesse (122). This passion, though, when approached from a more
subtle perspective, requires some qualification. It is not enough to be passionate
about a thing — an equation in physics, for instance — because it has a political or
didactical consequence (or any justification that transcends the thing itself). This
may be part of why one is interested in physics, but to be authentically
educational, one must “just affirm that something is good and worth
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preserving…the proof of this [being] fully immanent to the study of the thing in
question” (128, italics in original). The reason for this insistence is partially due to
the nature of the authors’ inquiry. As an investigation into the ‘ontology’ of
teaching, those considerations foreign to the very act of teaching are given less
focus. However, there is also an argument presented by the authors meant to
convince those unconcerned with teaching’s ontological roots that an immanent
value theory is preferable even in the face of well-meaning politicization. So long
as political action is understood as inherently progressive, in the sense that its
purpose is always to organize against an existing state of affairs “through the
interruption of dissensus,” the autonomy developed within education necessarily
precedes political action (155).

“In order to start conceiving that there is no necessity in a given order of
things (i.e. in the police [political] order), one must first experience that one
is a creature of ability. To achieve political subjectivization, one must first
live through a strong experience of potentiality. In that sense education is a
condition for politics” (157).

This initial experience of potentiality is built on the assumption that the attitude
surrounding each lesson is one of opportunity, in which students are free to
transform themself in relation to the ‘thing’ studied — and not to have themselves
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transformed, didactically or otherwise, by the teacher. To encourage this, teachers
ought to recognize the value of their subject-matter as immanent first, and as
consequentially political or didactic second.20 Even if education necessarily entails
political consequences, its importance, value, and purpose cannot be wholly
reduced to teaching the correct political framework. As the previous argument
shows, this ought to be accepted even by those who would have all schools profess
some political position, because political action requires a sense of agency and
autonomy. This, too, is in line with Western philosophy’s insistence upon
creativity, and its suspicion of dogmatization.
The second attitude which ought to be adopted by teachers is one of
epistemological trust towards their students. In the authors’ words: “it must be
assumed that we all have the same capacity to make sense of [a studied ‘thing’]”
(52). This means that students should be taken seriously when they express their
understandings of a subject. Their capacity to interpret a thing of study being the
same as the teacher’s, each opinion they express is potentially spot-on until the
thing itself proves otherwise. Following the notion of a thing’s withdrawal, the
student should also be taken seriously because they may expose an aspect of the
thing existing within the teacher’s blindspot. This assumption of equality is given

This distinction might appear as if splitting hairs, or even as one discouraging of a student’s
moral development. This fight against the political instrumentalization of education is a larger
thrust within Towards an Ontology, in which the authors connect the politicization of education to
disproportionately student-centered approaches. When education is completely restricted to
performing a function outside the very act of education itself (e.g. to support a political or ethical
agenda), the ‘thing’ being studied is overshadowed. This viewpoint will be qualified some by our
subsequent investigation of Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
20
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substance by the authority of the studied ‘thing,’ which equalizes all who gather
around it as studiers. After all, if our capacities are equivalent, no one can express
a better opinion by nature of their character — all opinions require justification
from the ‘thing’ studied. Whether a poem means this or that does not depend upon
whether the student is for this and the teacher is for that, what matters is that the
poem itself evidences one or the other. In mathematics as well, one does not
usually present the solution to an equation without first running through their
simplification process to show how their solution is yielded. This is an example of
relying on the authority of the ‘thing’ to justify one’s opinion. Teaching in line
with this assumption of equality is contrasted with a pedagogy that assumes
fundamental inequality between the teacher and their students. In this latter
instance, a teacher believes that their goal is to replicate their understanding in the
student, who requires (in the case that the ‘thing’ be a book) “a series of
reasonings in order to explain the series of reasoning that constitute the book”
(Ranciere 1991, quoted in Towards an Ontology). The teacher, being the final
judge of when an explanation has been successfully explained, is likely never to
feel that they have accomplished their task adequately, and to go on explaining
perpetually. For that reason, they will often, if unintentionally, prevent student
voices from surfacing. Even if an eventual equality is what these teacher-centered
educators aim for, they will never achieve it. At each step along the way, their
working axiom of inequality guarantees it. This is not to say that there really is no
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divide between the teacher and the student, indeed, Vlieghe and Zamojski make it
clear that their “equality…is not a factual claim about what there is. Rather, it is a
fiction” (50). But it is a fiction that can be ‘verified’ through praxis, so long as the
student feels empowered and impassioned enough to offer their perspective.
Although an affirmative stance towards one’s object of study and a
presupposition of equality in the classroom are attitudes, they clearly entail some
action. This is the second kind of way a teacher might institute a thing-centered
pedagogy. The first action entailed is that one present their thing of study in an
interesting way. It ought to appear to students as something complex enough to
warrant study, but with an entry point that does not discourage effort. Indeed, “the
entry point has to be sophisticated enough to grip a student’s attention and to keep
it focused…[while being] accessible in spite of its complexity” (141). The purpose
of making one’s subject accessibly interesting is to prevent its study from
becoming a “tedious experience,” whose value is vague, and to encourage it as
something “appealing and worthwhile” (118). In the end, this allows the studied
thing to be affirmed, because it is given the opportunity to inspire passion. The
authors offer Leonard Bernstein, former conductor of the New York Philharmonic,
as being exemplary in this regard. This is because Bernstein, throughout his
educational Young People’s Concerts, uses his subject (music), to show why
certain elements of that subject are important (modes, orchestration, and affect).
By playing a single line of music with different orchestrations, he shows (not
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merely tells) how some forms of orchestration are more favorable than others,
allowing his students to become interested in a part of music that at first seemed
complicated or unimportant. Something similar is often done in chemistry classes,
where a teacher will mix chemicals together, causing a reaction that shows why
those chemicals themselves are important — nitrogen isn’t just an element on the
table, but something whose presence does something. This allows the subject,
chemistry, to speak for itself, to reveal its own importance. Presenting one’s
subject so forwardly “prevents that things [be] turned into objects,” i.e. prevents
that something complex and ambiguous enough to invite study (the withdrawing
‘thing’) be turned into something clearly-defined, simplified, and unresponsive to
inquiry (56). When a thing is given the context to speak for itself in the classroom
(as with music and chemistry), it reveals its own knowledge about itself, proving
that it is not the teacher’s personal construction, nor the teacher’s gatekept
privilege. It is public, part of the world, discoverable in the world, and therefore
interesting — making it worthy of study.
Along with utilizing a thing’s self-revelation, metaphoric language and
gestures relevant to the students’ backgrounds is another method of revealing that
what is being studied exists within the world. The key here is “mobiliz[ing]
familiar concepts in order to bring students nearer to the thing of interest” (121).
The authors offer Bernstein’s metaphorization in the teaching of music as an
example of how to accomplish this mobilization. When orchestration is compared
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to a musical notes’ wearing the right clothes, or to a collection of notes being
either family or friends with one another,21 an entry point is established in the
study of music. Through familiar imagery Bernstein has made a complicated
subject accessible, without simplifying it. What matters, however, is not
metaphorization itself, but that a teacher “appeal to things everyone can notice” in
their presentation of a subject — thereby allowing an entry point (121). If a
professor wishes to close-read a moment within some treatise of philosophy, a
thing-centered strategy would require a presentation similar in spirit to
Bernstein’s, one that invites our study by revealing how the topic at hand is
comparable to moments within our own lives. Or, what’s better, like the chemistry
teacher, finding a way in which the philosophic moment could reveal itself. This
may require setting up the classroom in a particular way to establish a context in
which the philosophy appears as relevant,22 or asking students to play out specific
scenarios examinable in terms of the studied philosophy. The conclusion here is
that a teacher should present their class’ subject in an interesting and familiarizing
way, because doing so affirms the subject as existing in the world, equalizes study
of the subject as partially familiar to all parties, and provides a entry-point through
which students will become engaged with the subject. These demands adhere to

21

Through repeated use of the metaphor, it becomes clear that some notes are meant to be
played by certain instruments for certain purposes. Just like how no one would go to the pool in a
sweater, “the opening of Gershwin’s Rhapsody in Blue” should not be played by the viola (118).
22
Think of bringing a collection of wooden blocks, in the shape of numbers, to be placed above a
reflective surface. This would allow (at least) the first three segments of Plato’s divided line to
reveal themselves in the presence of everyone: reflection, perceivable substance, and the idea of
a number.
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the recognition in Western philosophy that emotional attitudes (interest and
passion) as well as concrete contextualizations (a thing’s revealing itself) are
necessary for the development of one’s reasoning.
Throughout this summary of Towards an Ontology’s impact on modern
pedagogical theory, a few things have been ascertained: 1) a class’ proper subject
is not the opinions of its teacher, nor the opinions of its students, but the thing to
be studied itself. 2) Upholding the class’ purpose, one accepts that no person has
attained perfect knowledge of the thing in question. This prevents teachercenteredness, and allows the thing to ‘withdraw’ into mystery, provoking
interesse. 3) To affirm the thing as worthy of study, the teacher must present its
value as immanent, irreducible to politics or ethics. For the purpose of this study,
classroom dynamics are fostered in an equality established by the thing, and
everyone’s recognized ability to understand the thing. 4) To verify this equality,
and provoke further interest in the thing itself, a teacher establishes contexts in
which the subject reveals itself, and speaks in ways that naturalize the subject
within students’ lives.
The thing-centered pedagogy presented here is incredibly consistent with
the internal demands of Western philosophy and its practice. The encouragement
of reason-productive emotional attitudes and a subject’s concrete
contextualizations are required as criteria of both. Autonomy and creativity,
something axiomatically established by each student’s equivalent capacity to
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investigate a subject, grounds the agency to reinterpret past philosophy
presupposed by the Western tradition. Finally, the notion that a thing naturally
withdraws into mystery (that the more we learn, the more we learn to
acknowledge our ignorance), encourages the recognition in Western philosophy
that progress is made communally. Indeed, it even offers a route of potential
synthesis for the antinomies noted in Descartes. While an unlimited amount of
progress can be made individually, we become aware with each step towards
knowledge that it would take an entire community to reveal the subject’s
complexity. If one accepts that there is a general consistency between the aims of
these two fields, one should also accept that the means of practicing the one
(pedagogy), is also a great means of practicing the other (Western philosophy). In
other words, to teach Western philosophy according to this pedagogy would be to
teach philosophy in a properly philosophic way.
But one perspective on the current state of pedagogical research is hardly a
summary of something so vast. Our next section will detail how philosophy ought
to be taught in accordance with another example of modern pedagogy, and how
these two pedagogical theories cohere with one another.

Pedagogy of The Oppressed: Reading Pedagogy, one progressively understands
that to put its teaching strategy into practice with complete integrity would be near
impossible within a college setting today. For those sympathetic to Freire’s cause,
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this should already be clear. Academia within the United States is too entangled in
private profit and national interest to be the place of “revolutionary effort to
transform [oppressive] structures” (126, italics added) if those words are to be
taken with the proper seriousness. It is too conspicuous a place. For those
unfamiliar with Freire’s work, there are three practical ways in which his proposed
teaching strategy contradicts current standards within college classrooms.
First, that within this theory, the “starting point for [any] educational
process” requires a “thematic investigation,” in which a team of researchers
immerse themselves within the culture of those being educated, in order to create a
plan of education most suited to the community’s needs (106). This requires a
substantial amount of interaction with one’s students prior to any unified meeting,
something which the organization of academia is not prepared for.
Second is the multidisciplinary nature of Freire’s pedagogical plan. A
college course in academia is meant to educate students regarding the single field
in which it exists, as its pedagogical system assumes other courses will fill in what
information about the world is left out. Freire, though, is designing a system meant
to attract and cooperate with people who do not have access to the combined
comprehensiveness of a four-year university program. In such a case, the teachers
must have a working knowledge of philosophy, anthropology, sociology,
economics, and political science in order to invite their students to become
conscious of their social reality. The goal of Freire’s program is to “avoid the
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narrow outlines of partial or ‘focalized’ views of reality, and stick to the
comprehension of total reality” (108). Yet, the organization of a college class is
bent on offering one focalized view among many, hence the ability of professors
to title their classes ‘discrete mathematics,’ or ‘existentialism.’ One college course
can do as much as it can towards this end, but it cannot represent a holistic account
of reality as such.
The final, unbridgeable gap between academia (as it stands) and Freire’s
pedagogy naturally follows from the previous two. In order to conduct the
necessary thematic investigations, and to investigate reality according to each of
the social sciences, a team of educators is required. What’s more, this team is
recommended to compose itself of at least a few members representing the
community of people being educated. This ensures that the traditional dichotomy
between student and teacher (similarly criticized within Towards an Ontology) is
made ambiguous, and set aside in favor of solidarity between people generally. I
need not mention that it is expected practice within academia for each college
course to be taught by a single professor. In this way, for a third time, Freire’s
purposes are disappointed by academic organization at large. Be that as it may,
Freire seems optimistic in the ability of college professors to maintain some role
within the development of his pedagogy. Citing conversations with professors
(along with laborers) to enhance his arguments, as well as encouraging “specialists
[outside the team of educators]…for instance…university professor[s]” to present
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topics to the students within his pedagogy, Freire reminds us that those within
academia need not be enemies of this particular technique, even if they cannot
perfectly instantiate it (122).
Before we address how a professor might weave Pedagogy’s broader
methodology into their courses (and indeed, what this broader methodology
consists of), there is one last conflict which deserves mentioning: Towards an
Ontology believes itself to be inconsistent with any emancipatory or critical
pedagogy, and specifically with Friere’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed.23 Towards
an Ontology takes this stance for two important reasons. First, because
“emancipatory pedagogy…see[s] education [merely] as an instrument for bringing
about a more just, tolerant, and equal society,” which, though a proper political
goal, remains a “functionalistic subordination of education” to an external end
(Vlieghe, 71). This strategy fails to justify learning as immanently good (or good
for itself). For that reason, it is neither proper to education’s ontology, nor
supportive of the student’s ability to transform themself in relation to the thing
being studied, as they are instead transformed by the teacher’s belief regarding
“how a perfect society should look” (72). The second contradiction between these
two pedagogies is intimately linked with the first. It is only because “evil is part of
the present” that the oppressed require emancipation, and therefore the
politicization discussed above (82). What is loved, cared for, and appreciated, is

This is likely do to the popularity of Friere’s work as a general representative of emancipatory
education.
23
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not the existing world of things-to-be-studied, but the “promise of a better world to
come” (83). Such a premise is at odds with Towards an Ontology’s insistence that
we learn best about the world through affirming its inherent, and present value.
These, then, are the initial conflicts that arise from attempting to synthesize
Pedagogy with a college course whose direction has been equally set by thingcentered strategies: first, that certain of its recommendations are untenable (as
academia exists today); second, that the intention of a teacher to direct their
students down a particular political path distracts from education’s immanent
value, as well as the students’ autonomy; and third, that its criticism of the present
world bars students from discovering value and love for the things that they study.
It is important to note that while the first difficulty I have introduced myself, the
latter two rely merely on Vlieghe and Zamojski’s interpretation of Pedagogy. As I
summarize the points to be drawn from Freire’s work, I will also show how
Vlieghe and Zamojski fail to address those elements of Pedagogy that prove it to
be consistent with a thing-centered education: in the sense of immanent value,
political freedom, and love for the present world.
Freire defines his emancipatory pedagogy as one which, fundamentally,
“must be forged with, not for, the oppressed in the incessant struggle to regain
their humanity” (48). The meaning of this conviction is partially revealed by those
actions which Freire believes such an attitude necessitates: constructing an
educational plan around the things most relevant to the community, and involving
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students in the determination of what these relevant things are (110). In
committing to these actions — which could take a variety of forms — teachers
deny that their students are fundamentally ignorant. They provide an entry point
for students into a subject matter by “constantly re-form[ing] [their] reflections in
the reflection of the students” (80). To ignore the knowledge that students already
possess of their community’s world, in which certain things seem more worthy of
study than others, would be to assert that “the professionals are the [only] ones
with a ‘world view’” (156). Such a perspective leads to what Freire has coined the
‘banking model’ of education, “in which the scope of action allowed to the
students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits” made by
an ‘educator’ (72). If the professor believes themself to know, not only more than,
but also what is definitively best for the students to be taught, then the students
themselves lose any justification for autonomy in the classroom. They are turned
into an object being educated, as opposed to the subject for which education is
purposed.
This is a strange perspective for Freire to adopt if what Vlieghe and
Zamojski charge him with is true: that his teacher is one set on controlling the
political outcome of their students. What seems stranger still is Freire’s emphasis
on the freedom of decision in his definition of human development generally,
something which requires “that there be a movement of search and creativity
having its seat of decision in the searcher” (161). In other words, whenever
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someone is “deprived of their own power of decision,” they lose out on properly
developing educationally, and personally as well (161). To simply enforce a
political program in one’s classroom would be propagandistic, and therefore a
mode of conquest by which a teacher further alienates one’s students.24 Instead,
along with providing student-recommended entry points into course material, the
teacher ought to present their students with opportunities for decision making.
They do this by posing an “existential, concrete, present situation to the people as
a problem which challenges them and requires a response — not just at an
intellectual level, but at the level of action” (95-96). By framing their content
around the concerns of their students, and ensuring that this content present
questions whose answers are deferred, ultimately, to the students themselves, the
teacher avoids ‘banking,’ and instead educates alongside the students. This is
consistent with the autonomy students embody when investigating things of study
in Towards an Ontology, and therefore does not, despite the allegations of Vlieghe
and Zamojski, prevent students from developing the initial, undetermined
potentiality necessary for political engagement.
An inquiry into the situations that Pedagogy recommends studying may be
useful, both to illuminate the unique benefits of an emancipatory pedagogy, and to
reveal the ways in which it avoids student-centeredness and teacher-centeredness.

“It is not our role to speak to the people about our own view of the world, nor to attempt to
impose that view on them, but rather to dialogue with the people about their view and ours…The
oppressors are the ones who act upon the people to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a
reality which must remain untouched” (96, 94).
24
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Note first how the banking form of pedagogy recalls the teacher-centeredness
fought against in Towards an Ontology. Indeed, the two arise under similar
circumstance, when “the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or
her own professional authority” (73). Pedagogy, however, like its thing-centered
alternative, does not move from teacher-centeredness to student-centeredness. It
recognizes, in the authority of knowledge generally, that something beyond
student or teacher is what determines the accuracy of statements. What’s more,
this ‘authority of knowledge’ need not be abstract, it often takes the form of an
“object by which [the teacher and student] are mediated” (93). In this way,
“authentic education is not carried on by ‘A’ for ‘B’ … but rather by ‘A’ with ‘B,’
mediated by the world — a world which impresses and challenges both parties”
(93). Whatever is being studied, whether it be a situation to be interpreted, or a
thing to be investigated, must not be mistaken for an opinion which already exists
in somebody’s mind. As in Towards an Ontology, something is studied when both
teacher and student are able to recognize its ability to withdraw into mystery, and
therefore to authoritatively reveal itself in spontaneous forms.
What we have yet to fully acknowledge is that these subjects being studied
manifest themselves as things within the world, or are purposed to describe the
world. Chemistry is representative of atoms and their bonds, biology the living
structures those atoms create, and philosophy the logic underpinning our
assessments. This is perhaps why a pedagogy that denies the world its due value is
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worrisome. In Freire’s emancipatory pedagogy, however, there arises an even
more fundamental reason to affirm the world as it exists: it is because people are a
part of this world. Indeed, following Sartre’s distinction between people as
conscious disclosers of being, and the world as that which lacks all signification
prior to its disclosure, we must “deny that the world exists as a reality apart from
people” (81). Without signification, nothing could be said of our world,
descriptions would go no further than to depict our imagined construction of it.
Similarly, though more obviously, without a world to inhabit, nobody could exist.
To deny the world its inherent value, then, would also be to deny the value of the
people who comprise it. Acknowledging this is important, because it demonstrates
why Freire, like Vlieghe and Zamojski, must and does affirm the world as one of
natural worth. Before one can transform the world to the benefit of the people
within it, an end natural to all emancipatory pedagogies, it is essential that one
develop a “profound love for the world and for people” (89). In an educational
setting, this thing-centered and people-centered affirmation persists. For “if I do
not love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love people — I cannot
enter into dialogue,” and it is precisely this dialogue between students and teachers
which must be maintained to educate one another, both according to Freire, as
well as the edicts of Western philosophy (90).
In order to affirm the world, however, one must perceive it. This may not
initially appear as much of a difficulty — the world, and all those things which
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make it up, seem to be right in front of us. Freire cautions that it is rarely so simple
for the underprivileged. In cases where an organization, government, or class of
people rely on the insecurity of another for their wealth, the privileged group
perpetuates itself only so long as that other remains ignorant of their own situation
within the world. This is because any true perception of the world would enable
rebellion. To quiet the oppressed and their sentiments for worldly engagement, the
oppressor must “mythicize the world…present[ing] for the consideration of the
oppressed and subjugated a world of deceit designed to increase their alienation
and passivity” (139). This world becomes “a fixed entity,” much as how, to the
short-term benefit of large corporations, the ubiquity of single-use plastics and the
immensity of carbon emissions seem unchangeable to those most oppressed (139).
Emancipatory pedagogies aim to counteract this false perception of the world by
revealing the falsity of those myths that obscure it. Such a pedagogy might reveal
that certain recycling symbols are put on particular plastics to disguise the fact that
there is no infrastructure capable of recycling them. This stance is not one of
hatred for the world, but a necessary step towards revealing a world deserving of
appreciation, and therefore of study. If a class’ syllabus discloses how certain
groups benefit from certain perspectives, it has gone a step in the right direction
towards demystifying the world’s obscurities.
Thus, an analysis of Pedagogy’s initial arguments (that students should
play a role, if not the role, in what they learn, that things should be studied by
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posing them in the situations they evoke in the world, and that this world ought to
be disclosed in its truth, as fundamentally connected to people, and therein
essentially malleable) are quite consistent with the values of a thing-centered
pedagogy. There are no forced political paths, there is no contempt for the world,
and education itself takes on immanent value in its relationship with people, who
are immanently valuable. What remains to be discussed now are those elements of
Pedagogy not so immediately linked with the concerns of Towards an Ontology.
These being: 1) that what is taught in class should naturally provoke action outside
of the class, 2) that to study something, one must study it in its worldly context,
and 3) that solidarity and communication between students furthers these goals.
The argument presented by (1), that conceptual analysis has part of its end
in action, should already seem familiar. Within the discipline of Western
philosophy there exists a strong tradition towards developing one’s happiness and
fulfillment through practical affairs discoverable via reason. Recall also that
practical experience itself had a similar end in conceptualization, insofar as these
experiences provide philosophers with new perspectives and objects to reflect
upon. Pedagogy’s analysis of the relationship between these two faculties helps to
explain the cyclical way in which they seem to balance each other as means and
ends. Freire concludes, likely from his time spent witnessing which pedagogical
strategies most empowered his students, that to “establish an authentic form of
thought and action” we must not “dichotomize this reflection from action” (83).
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Much like how, in the Western tradition, thought leads to action which leads to
thought, Freire is describing a pedagogical method whereby “reflection — true
reflection — leads to action…[and] when the situation calls for action, that
action…become[s] the object of critical reflection” (66).
It can be frustrating for students when the material being covered appears
fundamentally unconnected to the world in which they live. The best solution for a
teacher in such a scenario is to demonstrate how the knowledge being conveyed
might provide insight into the states of affairs, or states of meaning, that are
present in their students’ lives — thus inviting new forms of action. The key here
is to inspire in students a “more active…attitude…in regard to the exploration of
their [lives’] thematics” (106). This should be particularly doable within a
philosophy course, as the knowledge conveyed has been intended by its author to
be universally apparent to all those who study it. Practically speaking, encouraging
this attitude may take the form of assigning experiential homework, in which one
must do something in the world. The benefit of such an assignment, of course, is
only fully realized when it is accompanied by critically thinking. One might ask
their students: “did your experience make you any more skeptical of the
philosophy in question, or did it affirm what we’ve been learning in class?” Recall
that Towards an Ontology encouraged its teachers to present their material in an
interesting and familiarizing way — something which this assignment is also well
positioned to accomplish.
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Of course, if we acknowledge that a student’s action in the world ought to
be in some way influenced by the material being taught, we come to an additional
conclusion as well, the conclusion of (2): that the context of a thing —
understanding the places in which it has, does, and will appear — matters in one’s
studying it. For, without this worldly context, a student would find difficulty
discovering a thing’s place and purpose within the world. Because a class is
always teaching about certain “significant dimensions” of the world, it only makes
sense that these dimensions “be perceived as dimensions of [a] total reality” (104).
This total reality is comprised of many things that are not the focus of a class, but
insofar as these things naturally interact with the focus, they ought to be
mentioned, in order to reassure the student that their class’ subject is not isolated
from the world itself. To go a step further,25 this teacher ought to uncover which
aspects of reality are most salient within their student’s experience, and talk
specifically about how these things interact with the subject at hand. That is what
it means to contextualize a topic. Furthermore, because the discipline of Western
philosophy, Towards an Ontology, and Pedagogy all stress that reality be affirmed
and investigated, it should be mentioned that to teach about reality as something
fragmented (isolated into bits and pieces which do not connect), denies the truth of
its holistic presence. When “approaching [the world] in fragments which
[students] do not perceive as interacting constituent elements of the whole” it

And here is where a teacher’s “thematic investigation” of the students lives prior to a class’
being taught would be beneficial (though impossible in academia today).
25
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becomes the case that these students “cannot truly know [their] reality” (104).
When teaching John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, for
instance, it would be beneficial to expose one’s students to the array of arguments
debating whether skin color could be reckoned a nominal essence of man, and
therein a basis for racism, as this is a concern immediately real within many
students’ lives. Another suggestion this analysis implies would be to ask one’s
students for specific questions arising in their own life, and proceed from there by
examining whether Locke’s epistemology offers a new way of framing the
conditions for possible answers.
To provoke action from students by contextualizing the course within their
own experience clearly requires intelligent communication between teacher and
student, which itself represents (3) — the last requirement of Pedagogy to be
discussed. What might be less obvious, though no less crucial, is that it requires
communication between students as well. This is at once a fundamental premise of
Pedagogy, in that it is treated as self-evidently beneficial,26 as well as something
justified by the poor results of those who refuse to work in community with their
fellow people. In a clear reference to the individualism promoted by those who
would (and have) pursued profit over environmental and social health, Freire
reminds us that “attempting to be more human, individualistically, leads to having
more, egoistically, a form of dehumanization” (85-6). The solution is to pursue our

“If I do not love people — I cannot dialogue…[For] how can I dialogue if I am closed to — and
even offended — by the contribution of others?” (90).
26
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humanity through an education that encourages “fellowship and solidarity” among
all involved (85). This means, in one sense, refusing to “impede communication”
between students whenever possible, as doing so “reduce[s] men to the status of
‘things,’” signaling that the creativity and autonomy advocated for by Towards
and Ontology and Western philosophy is not theirs to embody (128). This is not to
say that students should talk over the teacher during a presentation of material, this
would be dismissive of the teacher’s purpose, talent, and preparative work. But, to
the same extent, a teacher should not talk over their students. This means denying
the temptation to educate ‘above’ one’s students, and instead embracing the
educational equality expressed in Towards an Ontology (in which a thing of study
is never completely known by one person, and therefore not the intellectual
property of any one person). It also means giving one’s students the time to talk
with each other, and with the teacher, just as they give the teacher time to present
material. Conceptually speaking, this implies that the teacher should give their
presentation to the students, in order that the students might have something to
speak about with one another. The teacher should also remind their students (as
they too should be reminded) that anything liberatory, including the acquisition of
knowledge, is a “common task” (176). To go it alone is neither as fulfilling, nor as
successful, as to pursue an objective in solidarity with others.
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The Aims of a Philosophical Pedagogy Defined: Pedagogy of the Oppressed and
Towards an Ontology both maintain a general consistency with the aims of
Western philosophy. Recall that these aims were to promote:
1. The recognition that our use of reason is inescapably linked to certain
emotional attitudes which encourage reasoning, and concrete
contextualizations that make sense of reasoning.
2. The recognition that our faculties of autonomy and creativity allow for the
development of unique worldviews required for philosophy to be
interpreted, critiqued, and improved.
3. The recognition that theories and their critiques are best pursued
communally, insofar as different perspectives sharpen the accuracy and
scope of philosophic theories.
For this reason, I use our analysis of the two pedagogies not to alter these aims,
but rather to provide practical answers to the questions of how such aims are to be
realized. This is made only easier by the practical nature of both works — they are
pedagogies meant to be practiced. What has not been sufficiently determined,
however, is whether these aims of philosophy are completely comprehensive of all
the aims argued for by either pedagogies. If any practical recommendation made
by these works is intended to fulfill something beyond the scope of the tradition of
Western philosophy, this will mean that a new aim requires our attention. Because
the pedagogy of academic philosophy must fulfill the ends of both pedagogy, and
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Western philosophy, these latter, undiscovered aims are also of importance. To
proceed, I attach practices recommended by the pedagogies to those aims of
Western philosophy that they (either intentionally or incidentally) fulfill. If any
practice seems unaccounted for, or insufficiently matched, this will mean that a
new aim must be developed for the pedagogy of academic philosophy.
First, we ask, how should emotional attitudes conducive to an education in
philosophy, particularly inspiration and uncertainty, be fostered within students?
Pedagogy answers that assigning students homework necessitating action out in
the world puts students into a position of uncertainty, where their action may
affirm or put into doubt the conclusions developed in the classroom. Conversely,
the world itself can be made uncertain within the classroom, through the former’s
demystification, in which things formerly believed are proven deceptive. That
things being studied are given the freedom to ‘withdraw’ into mystery is important
to acknowledge in the pursuit of demystification, because it reassures us that the
world is not ‘fixed.’ Following this uncertainty, inspiration is likely to come, as
the students understand their freedom to pursue such questions. A communicative
atmosphere within the classroom can also be positioned to inspire.
Equally important is the question: How should reason be contextualized?
Both works answer that, by creating entry points to knowledge through the
students’ own personal contexts, and presenting simulated situations for analysis,
anything taught in the classroom can be done more effectively, and contextually.
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Next: How does one encourage their students to develop autonomy and
creativity? We have found that one ought to incorporate into their lesson plan
assignments and activities in which students are not pigeon-holed into one
justification for a single correct answer. Within a philosophy course, this might
take the form of assigning papers in which students construct their own philosophy
within the tradition being analyzed. Students would enjoy autonomy, creativity
(certainly), and all the while demonstrate knowledge of a tradition’s rules, as well
as the shortcomings of philosophers within that system, whose work undoubtedly
misses some concerns to which the students are privy.
In addition, we ask: How might students be taught to develop knowledge
communally (as is done by professionals within every field)? Once more
Pedagogy presents a clear and passionate answer. Allowing one’s community of
students to influence the flow of discourse within a class, and weaving in group
discussions within class, are great first steps. What really synches things, however,
is assigning tasks for the students in which they do something, in an active sense,
all together or within small groups. As in classic leadership classes, this promotes
group comradery and solidarity. What Pedagogy assures us is that such solidarity
will boost each student’s interest in, and creativity spent upon the class. Towards
an Ontology, by insisting that things be studied, as opposed to any one person’s
opinion regarding those things, promotes communal inquiry as well, insofar as no
agent has the power to sidestep the reasonings of another.
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There is one significant premise adopted by these two works, however, that
is not explicitly present within the three goals internally established by Western
philosophy: that people, and the malleable world people inhabit, are each
inherently valuable. For both works, these premises are intimately linked with the
practice of pedagogy. Something’s status as true entails that it be affirmed by the
teacher’s actions. People’s fundamental worth is so crucial to Pedagogy that its
opening paragraph defines “humanization” as “the people’s [fundamental]
vocation,” and “the problem of [attaining] humanization” as the “central problem”
of humankind (43). Here humanization refers, but is not limited to, “the
emancipation of labor…the overcoming of alienation…[and] the affirmation of
men and women as persons” (44). The general tone of Pedagogy would also
suggest that humanization involves establishing rich communities and respecting
one another as people to be learned from. Recall that this love of people, though, is
linked to a love of the world. This is only natural from Freire’s perspective, as the
world and human consciousness could only exist together. Thus we see that “if I
do not love the world — if I do not love life — if I do not love people,” the task of
humanization becomes impossible (90). This aim to humanize should have very
real pedagogical consequences, involving (at least) the teacher’s support and
encouragement in pursuing humanizing activities outside of class.27 A step further

“Just as objective social reality exists not by chance, but as the product of human action, so it
is not transformed by chance. If humankind produce social reality, then transforming that reality is
an historical task, a task for humanity” (51).
27
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would involve using a class’ subject to introduce socially humanizing practices
that students may not yet have envisioned as possible.28
The love presented in Towards an Ontology is described somewhat
differently, but requires similar action for those educators who would instantiate it.
What this love means is best stated during the authors’ description of the teacher,
whose role is “maintaining an affirmative attitude towards the world, based on a
decision to recognize one’s love for a particular thing as an event…to [be]
sustain[ed]” (36). Much like in Pedagogy, this love for the world could only be
coeval with a love for people, as “love for a thing involves the necessity of sharing
this love with others,” which one does as an encouraging educator (36). To fall in
love with a subject, however, and to maintain one’s “fidelity to [this] event”
require some action on the part of teachers (35). In the case where one’s part of the
world is either opposed to the subject one loves, or (what’s more likely) indifferent
to it, this fidelity means “creating something new (a counter-state, an exception)
within the dominant order…a gap or a slot that doesn’t fit, that can’t be taken into
account” (35). These gaps are created through “small alterations [to the world],”
no matter if they “may seem to be irrelevant or irrational” (35). Practically
speaking, this might entail a teacher’s assigning their students to teach a certain
concept learned in class to someone outside of class — proceeding afterward by
reflecting about which aspects of the concept were the most difficult, or the easiest

28

Encouraging students to start a community book club in a literature class, or a community
garden in a sustainability class might represent this kind of aim.
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to convey, and proposing theories as to why. It might also involve students
creating an art project that represents ideas learned in class, one which the students
may feel compelled to keep with them as a memento, inspiring future
conversations about the subject one loves. The key, in any case, is “offer[ing] the
possibility [for anyone] to take up an affirmatory relation to the world” by learning
to affirm the subject one teaches as real and valuable” (35).
So then, along with the aims internal to Western philosophy, there is this
final aim uncaptured by the former, which involves teaching and encouraging an
inherent love for people and the world. One does this by taking advantage of their
subject’s ability to promote humanization and remove alienation. Throughout this
paper I have sought to demonstrate how the aims of Western philosophy and the
practices of these two pedagogical works are broadly consistent, and one may
already have noticed that this last pursuit is supported by, and further supports, the
other three. To inspire others, to assure them that the world is uncertain, and for
this reason, full of potential; to engage the practical concerns of each students’
life; to promote autonomy, creativity, and the integration of isolated items of
knowledge into a coherent worldview; to gather students together into a
community which recognizes its members unique contributions to knowledge —
these are all humanizing feats, that both reveal an affirmation of the world as
worthy of our attention, and a love for people as capable beings meant to progress
together. This works the other way around as well. That we love people is likely
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why any pedagogical aim takes on its importance. Further down there will be a
graph visually representing these aims and their practical ramifications. One ought
to remember, though, that such a graph is only for convenience, and in truth,
actions that serve one of these ends serve all of them.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge a certain criticism some might have in
mind. In analyzing Freire and Vlieghe / Zamojski’s works together, and presenting
a consistent message for which they both advocate, I have hoped to ease the
skepticism that this landscape has been described according to either author’s bias.
Despite this, a professional in the pedagogical field may still have reservations
about my picking these two works when so many others exist. I do not deny that
another scholar’s summation of the field may look different from my own —
nonetheless, I would like to remind my reader that these two works were not
chosen arbitrarily. Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Towards an Ontology of
Teaching are recent works (no more than 50 years old), that have been met with
more praise from the pedagogical community than criticism, and which are
explicitly informed by the work of philosophers. They are perfect candidates for
analyzing the goals inherent to a philosophical pedagogy.
Below is the aforementioned graphic representing each recommendation
developed throughout our investigation.
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While what has been accomplished up to this point is primarily constructive, it has
a critical meaning. By expressing what a college class in philosophy ought to look
like, we have built a tool capable of criticizing those currently practiced norms
which contradict our recommendations within the pedagogy of academic
philosophy. With that in mind, our investigation is set on accomplishing two more
things: first, it seeks to lay out the ways in which the pedagogy of academic
philosophy fails to meet the standards introduced above; second, it will present the
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beginnings of a syllabus (complete with notes and slides) for a philosophy class
meant to model how such standards could be achieved. This next chapter of the
investigation will focus on the former goal, namely, establishing a critical stance
towards the pedagogy of academic philosophy as it exists today.
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Chapter II: Two Problems in Current Pedagogical Practice,
and their Solution

Introduction
In this chapter I will bring together a variety of sources which document the
underutilization and misrepresentation of feminist, Africana, and Asian
philosophical literature within United States philosophy departments. I will also
summarize the pedagogical methods through which collegiate philosophy tends to
be taught (lecture, discussion, and essay) in order to show that these methods
struggle to make philosophy relevant in the lives of its students. I focus on these
two aspects of the pedagogy of academic philosophy because both can be
demonstrated to work against the four criteria discovered in chapter one. This is
not to say that they are the only shortcomings within philosophy, but rather that
they are of particular note, insofar as they undermine each of those values upon
which philosophy and good pedagogy ought to be based. At the end of each
section within this chapter, I will return to the criteria alluded to, and show how
they are contradicted by the elements of collegiate philosophy being analyzed.

A Lack of Diversity, and its Potential Inclusion
“In many departments, women find themselves alone on faculties or in graduate
school cohorts. Virtually all minorities in philosophy find themselves solos.
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Surviving as a solo is a painful and difficult process” (Haslanger, 211). This
section will delve into the relative absence of female, africana, and asian presence
within academic philosophy. It will also assure readers of the possibility of their
inclusion — that there are such philosophers, and that their work is relevant. The
contradictions that a lack of diversity has wrought within the current philosophical
pedagogy will be examined at the close of this section, and will rely upon the
definition of our ideal philosophical pedagogy from chapter I.
Women: Below is a graph first published in “Quantifying the Gender Gap: An
Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy,” which
reveals the proportion of women studying or working within academic philosophy
from the introductory to the professional level:
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This data was collected via surveys sent to 56 universities throughout the US, and
has since been used as evidence that “the proportion of women in philosophy
decreases with respect to the increase in status level within the academy” (952,
Paxton). Notice how slightly less than 50% of students attending introductory
classes identify as women, but that this number steadily drops to less than 30% by
the faculty level.29 The authors argue that their research supports two conclusions,
additional to the fact that there is a gender discrepancy in philosophy. First, that
the greatest proportional reduction in female participants between levels is the
jump from intro students to majors in philosophy. In other words, that it is far
more likely for a man who takes philosophy 101 to become a major than it is for a
woman. Second, and unshown by the graph, that there is “a significant positive
correlation between the proportion of philosophy majors who are female, and the
proportion of philosophy faculty who are female” (953). This was revealed by
comparing numbers of female faculty to numbers of female students from each
survey’s data. One likely interpretation for this relationship, perhaps something
already thought by the reader, is that “the mere presence of women faculty in
philosophy classrooms…allow[s] women students to feel that [the] discipline,
literally, comprehends them, that it is a space that they are free to enter” (955).

These numbers probably represent the “best-case scenario” for women, as the universities
which responded to the authors’ request (about 33%) were likely those which took diversity and
inclusion most seriously, and hence had the greatest female representation (955).
29
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While the investigation just examined provided a link between those who
teach and those who learn (that similar identities between the two will encourage
the learner), the paper also suggests that an alteration in class material, in the
figures who are taught, could “comprehend women” in a similar way (955). And,
of course, the inclusion of female philosophers in the classroom, even in the form
of figures studied, would improve any student’s learning experience. This should
not be unfamiliar after our analysis of contemporary pedagogy, and will be
explored later as well.
Moving on to a different kind of question, we have seen some of the data
surrounding female engagement in philosophy, but the experience of women has
not yet been described. This is where a paper by Sally Haslanger, the same quoted
at this section’s introduction, will come in handy. Published in 2008, Haslanger
begins with personal anecdotes and shared stories about women in philosophy
programs, and concludes with data and causal theories in order to explain the
mistreatment those stories disclose. She writes that “in graduate school, one of my
teachers told me that he had ‘never seen a first rate woman philosophy and never
expected to because women were incapable of having seminal ideas’” (211,
Haslanger). She describes how “in a seminar in philosophical logic, I was asked to
give a presentation on a historical figure when none of the other (male) students
were, later to learn that this was because the professor assumed I’d be writing a
thesis on the history of philosophy” (211). She mentions the existence of other

Denning 62

stories told to her by female colleagues, though on the whole expecting that her
audience is already familiar with the ways in which women are taken advantage of
in positions of subserviency. Philosophy, however, is unique in its foundational
adherence to masculine frameworks, she argues. It is unique in defining itself such
that it avoids traditionally feminine traits and thoughts.

“As feminist philosophers have been arguing for decades, the familiar
dichotomies with which Anglophone philosophy defines itself map neatly
onto gender dichotomies — rational/emotional, objective/subjective,
mind/body; ideals of philosophy — penetrating, seminal, and rigorous; and
what we do — attack, target, and demolish an opponent, all of which frame
philosophy as masculine and in opposition to the feminine” (213).

This cultural exclusion emanating from current philosophical ideals and topics
presents quite a problem for those who would prefer that the discipline make use
of human reason, as opposed to one unnaturally representative of masculine ideals.
What’s more, one ought to be disappointed in today’s one-sided expression of
philosophy insofar as it diverges from its own ideals examined above: emotional
engagement, autonomy, creativity, and communal investigation. The derogatory
alienation of any group of peoples is a direct strike against these values — but
more on this below.

Denning 63

Granting that there is a bias against women within philosophy, one question
that I have so far left open is how a philosophy professor might substitute one or a
few female figures for some of the men (Descartes, Locke, Kant, Plato, Hume,
Aquinas) endemic to intro-level courses. The unfortunate reality is that most
professional philosophers view these figures as, in one way or another,
irreplaceable. Indeed, many of us might wonder: if intro-level students require an
education in empiricism and rationalism, would it not be an educational crime to
withhold Hume, Descartes, or Kant from the syllabus? When we do so, however,
two fatal assumptions are made. First, that there really are no female rationalists,
empiricists, or (in the case of Kant) critical idealists, whose work was
contemporaneous and complementary to their famous male counterparts. And
second, that this one epistemological quandary, the eighteenth century empiricistrationalist dispute, is so crucial to one’s philosophical vocabulary that more easily
diversified fields (philosophical anthropology, privileged representations, thoughtaction dialectic, the construction of worldviews, etc.) would somehow leave
students under-educated.
These misconceptions are easily demystified by works such as Mary Ellen
Waithe’s four volume series A History of Women Philosophers, which
demonstrates how “in every historical epoch in which we have a record of men
engaging in philosophy, we also have a record of women engaging in philosophy”
(Walker, 154). Complementary to Locke and Descartes could be Catharine Trotter
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Cockburn, who was an avid, seventeenth-century supporter of empiricism and
Lockean ideas, and Antoinette Brown Blackwell, who in The Philosophy of
Individuality investigates epistemological consequences of mind-body dualism;
and the more flexible one becomes with their syllabus topics, the more female
philosophers relevant to the discussion tend to abound.
While works such as Waithe’s and countless others prove that women
philosophers could be incorporated into any syllabus, skeptical readers might
wonder whether we have shown that they ought to be. If Descartes wrote more
profoundly, more clearly about dualism than Blackwell (an influential, though
probably unprovable intuition), why spend any time teaching the latter? I ask this
question because the derogatory experiences of women in philosophy showcased
above, and the absence of female philosophers taught in classrooms point to the
question as being potentially commonplace. Before returning to what our
pedagogical research might say about such a question, Margaret Urban Walker in
an essay on feminist philosophy has a response which can be divulged as well.
Linked to the actual ideas about which many women write are often “certain
changes in the content and methodology” of their studies (157). Whether writing
about empiricism, rationalism, or feminism itself, there is a correlation between a
work’s valuing “the importance of keeping in view the many human experiences,
specific histories, social locations, and experiential standpoints that need to be
acknowledged in talking about humanity, society, value, and reality” and whether
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that work was written by a woman. This is not to say that these changes are
produced by every woman, nor only by women — it seems, however, that the
more women there are in each individual field, the more that field is willing to
research in community, and contextualize their studies through experience, both
things which philosophers have long valued.

The Africana Community: I use ‘Africana’ to refer to native Africans as well as
their descendents who have spread throughout the globe: the Afro-carribeans,
African Americans, muslims who consider themselves culturally “black,” and so
on. The term “Africana philosophy” therefore represents a very diverse group of
people, though it is nonetheless a proper category, whose philosophers have
themselves argued that their works share something of a family resemblance. A
focus on philosophical anthropology is one such resemblance, a field poignantly
“dedicated to the understanding of beings whose humanity has been called into
question,” whether through racism, slavery, or genocide (Gordon, 13). In his
Introduction to Africana Philosophy, Lewis R. Gordon also notes that most
philosophical problems raised by this tradition are in some way connected to “the
problems faced and raised by the African diaspora,” an ongoing event in which
Africans have been physically forced or otherwise pressured to leave their home
continent (13). That being so, the more ancient African civilizations (Nubia, the
Zulus, Egypt, etc.), through their genealogical link to present thinkers, can also be
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considered a part of the Africana tradition — much as Ancient Ionian, Athenian,
and Phoenician thought is considered Western (15). While there is certainly more
to be said about what Africana philosophy is, some basic characteristics are its
having been composed by a member of an Africana community, its focus on
questions particularly present in the lives of black folks (which could be liberation,
the relationship between a community and its government, defining ‘human-kind,’
etc.), and its utilization of other Africana sources. None of these, however, are
sufficient, nor necessary conditions for the presence of Africana philosophy.
One might notice that Africana thought seems curiously distinct from
Western philosophy, and for that reason, one may be skeptical of whether the
thoughts raised by the African diaspora have much to do with the discipline of
Western philosophy currently under investigation. This is to say, “Africana
thought is often accused of being of particular instead of universal significance” in
that its name seems to imply a fundamental ‘break’ from the Western tradition
(31). Interpreting this potential criticism in the kindest way, we could say that
while Western philosophy strives to make universal claims applicable to all human
experience, Africana philosophy seems focused on a particular experience, that of
Africans, and their diasporic descendents. Stated so plainly, it becomes easy to see
through the flaws of such a criticism, namely, that so-called “Western” philosophy
is also situated in an historical context which, in part, determines the questions it
deems as relevant. Mind-body dualism, transcendental idealism, and neoplatonism
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are core subjects within the Western tradition, while at the same time being
explicitly inspired by a Christian ontology. Surely, though, these theories have
something to teach the non-Christian (we’ve certainly been using them that way),
and for the same reason, Africana philosophy has something to teach the
Westerner, even if it has grown from a wholly different genealogical tree. In the
end, though, to say that it has no common roots with Western philosophy would be
demonstrably false. After all, the colonial labor camps and forced migration which
set the African identity, and Africana philosophy, into motion was a result of
Western society, and often coincided with Western philosophy.30 To best
understand the connection between these two disciplines, I will elongate the quote
begun above:

“Africana thought is often accused of being of particular instead of
universal significance. In response…many Africana philosophers argue that
such a conclusion would be in error because of the ironic inclusiveness of
Africana thought. A legacy of modern colonialism and racism is that to
articulate the set of problems and concerns of Africana thought one must

30

Locke was a prime figure in the colonization of the Americas and the establishment of slavery
in the Carolinas. It was alongside the Earl of Shaftesbury that Locke wrote the original
constitution of the Carolinian colonies, legalizing slavery in the process. He did this even while
contemporaneous colonies, notably Pennsylvania, denounced slavery from the beginning (see
Locke’s The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, and W.E.B de Bois’ The Suppression of the
African Slave Trade). Strangely enough, though, his Second Treatise on Government was also
used by eighteenth and nineteenth century abolitionists as a rallying cry (see Subjugation and
Bondage, Critical Essays on Slavery and Social Philosophy). All of this to show that Western
philosophy and the establishment of a Black identity have something to do with one another.
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engage the tradition that accompanied its emergence in the modern
world…Africana though is not against European thought but emerges along
with it…even Africana thinkers who avow a rejection of European thought
often do so through specifying the thought they reject, which means, in
effect, offering knowledge of that tradition” (31-2).

This is far from saying that Africana philosophy can be reduced to an offshoot of
European philosophy, it merely reflects the sad reality that culturally black authors
and philosophers have been forced to negotiate the violent ramifications of
European thought, often through creative and revelatory ways. The philosophy
done by black members of the Africana tradition is relevant to those working in
Western philosophy, insofar as well-thought criticism is relevant to any theory’s
construction.
The question now is whether Africana writers and students fair well in the
discipline of Western Philosophy. Much like women, however, there is a curious
absence of black encouragement and Africana topics within the classroom. As
Kathryn T. Gines notes in the introduction to her essay “Being a Black Woman
Philosopher,” The American Philosophical Foundation “has more than 11,000
members” and yet “there are still fewer than 125 black philosophers in the United
States” (429). At least a few of these philosophers have since written
autobiographical accounts of their experience within philosophy, accounts marked
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by both their love of the discipline, and their disappointment that “the history of
philosophy has been constructed as decidedly male and European” (433). Because
it is difficult to find more statistics on the subject, I will instead rely on the
reader’s own experience of black absence in philosophy classrooms, and the
personal accounts mentioned above.
George Yancy is one such philosopher, and describes his first encounter
with philosophy in The World Book Encyclopedia as involving “such names as
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke,
Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Russell, James, Dewey, and others…all white male faces,
studious and pensive” (2). What’s perhaps worse, however, are the “seven
categories” of philosophers listed by the encyclopedia: “American, British,
French, German, Greek, Roman, and Other Philosophers. But even under the
‘Other’ category, the names of African-American philosophers were no where to
be found” (3). Much like the case of women philosophers, this is not because there
is a genuine lack of African-American philosophers, but because they are widely
under-studied and under-taught. I hope that my syllabus on the subject of Natural
Law in part III of this essay will be its own proof of the ease with which a
professor of philosophy might incorporate Africana work into their classroom. For
now, though, I will use Leonard Harris’ words to describe the existence of African
authorship:
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“The society for the Advancement of American Philosophy’s (SAAP)
Newsletter is adorned with the pictures of ten archetypal American
philosophers: Emerson, Thoreau, Pierce, James, Dewey, Royce, Whitehead,
Santayana, Suckiel, and Dooley. Olaudah Equiano (Gustavus Vasa, the
African), author of a slave-narrative form of ethical and social critique;
David Walker, author of the impassioned call to arms by the enslaved;
Alexander Crummel, Cambridge-educated Platonist and moral suasionist;
Alain Locke, critical reletavist and radical pragmatist; do not adorn its
cover” (3).

One sad consequence of this lack of racially diverse perspective in philosophy is
that black students themselves feel that the philosophy they study was never
intended to be applicable to their own experience. Yancy describes this as “a
feeling of estrangement and discouragement,” which, following our previous
analysis of pedagogy, seems hostile to the creativity, personal contextualization,
and love of the material necessary for a philosophical education. In Blackness
Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race, Charles W. Mills makes a similar claim:
“The impatience and indifference that I have sometimes detected in black students
seems to derive in part from their sense that there is something strange in spending
a whole course describing the logic of different moral ideals, for example, without
ever mentioning that all of them were systematically violated for blacks.” It is
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strange to spend a whole course studying Locke’s social contract theory without
providing literature about African Americans — how they were sent to the
Americas, enslaved, and liberated only to end up in a country whose laws they had
not built, and whose social contract they had never consented to. My own syllabus
on natural law will explore what a class focused on Locke’s theories as applied to
an African American context would produce.
Much like with women, there is a world of Africana literature within
philosophy that goes untaught and unexplored, which has led to who knows how
many alienated Africana students within philosophy. I have examined some basic
statistics, some illuminating stories, and the possibility for inclusion that Africana
philosophy possesses.

Philosophy on the Asian Continent: In the introduction to a famous textbook,
Pojman’s Classics of Philosophy, something commonly used to teach the history
of philosophy to undergraduates, there is a statement worthy of analysis:

“The first philosophers were Greeks of the sixth century B.C. living on the
Ionian coast of the Aegean Sea, in Miletus, Colophon, Samos, and Ephesus.
Other people in other cultures had wondered about these questions, but
usually religious authority or myth had imposed an answer…Here for the
first time a pure philosophical and scientific inquiry was allowed to
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flourish. The Great Civilizations of Egypt, China, Assyria, Babylon, Israel,
and Persia, not to mention those of the Incas, Mayans, and Africans, had
produced art and artifacts and government of advanced sorts, but
nowhere…was anything like philosophy or science developed…Ancient
Chinese thought, led by Confucius (551-475 B.C.), had a deep ethical
dimension. But no epistemology or formulated logic. Now Greek
philosophy, especially from Socrates on, also had a practical bent and was
concerned with ethics, but it went deeper and further than ethics” (3-4).

I refer to this passage because, whether explicitly or implicitly, the belief that
philosophy began with the Greeks is reinforced within most educational
institutions in the US and Europe. It is not just Pojman who makes this
assumption, after all, but every philosopher who has rated his “pre-socratic texts
and intros”31 highly, from Kansas State University to Mississippi College,
University of Waterloo, John Carroll University, etc. as well as the many
professors who have taught his work uncritically. Lewis R. Gordon, in the
previously referred to Introduction to Africana Philosophy, recognizes this Grecocentric tendency as well, particularly as it relates to Ancient Chinese philosophers:

On the back of this book’s Third Edition, Joseph A. Novak (another big-name in contemporary
philosophy), writes that “I was impressed with the use of pre-socratic texts and the intros and
secondary literature references.” The notion that philosophy and science did not exist prior to the
Greeks is found throughout these particular intros.
31
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“To conclude that the kinds of intellectual activity that were called
philosophical in the past and have joined the fold in the present were thus
limited to one group of people, most of whom were artificially lumped
together to create false notions of unity and singular identity, requires a
model of humanity that does not fit the facts. The first, and most obvious
one, is that philosophical activity existed in ancient China at least a few
thousand years before Thales of Miletos (623-526 BCE), the first known
Greek philosopher, attempted to figure out the constitution of the universe.
The I Ching, for instance is generally believed to have been written in about
2852 BCE. Although an object could be made, as did Karl Jaspers (18831969) that ancient Chinese philosophy is more mystical and lacks a
sophisticated treatment of philosophy, I would encourage, in response, the
following pedagogical experiment. After introducing students to such
works, present any collection of pre-Socratic philosophy for their perusal. I
do just that when I teach courses on African philosophy, and the students
immediately see the point: philosophers of color engaging with the same
questions are treated as naive, simple, or mystical but ancient Greek
philosophers are revered for their supposed genius” (6-7).

To label Chinese thought as mystical and over-religious is both a method of
writing-off Chinese philosophy as nonsense undeserving of study, and a seemingly
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intentional lapse in memory that Western philosophy, at least since Plotinus, has
been irrevocably tied to Christian ontology, ideology, and epistemology.32
If our broadest conception of philosophy is the purusal of conclusions
according to argumentative strategies that appear universally cogent, there is
evidence to suggest that people around the world have been philosophizing for
some time. If this Greco-centric theory wishes to define philosophy as something
more specific, a discipline dealing especially in “epistemology and logic,” it
makes little difference. Pojman tells us that the fundamental question of
epistemology is “what is the really real, and not just a matter of appearance?”
Following Pojman, then, we are led to the strange conclusion that Mayan
astronomy (capable of predicting eclipses millenia apart), Egyptian mathematics
(known to have discovered the “Pythagorean Theorem” prior to Protagoras), and
Chinese semantics, metaphysics, ontology, and architecture was somehow
accomplished without cogent argumentation over what was real, provable, and
believable and what was seemingly real, provably false, and unbelievable. The
more one pulls the thread of this common Euro-centric theory the more it seems to
fall apart.

32

This is not to say that all Western philosophers are Christian, but that many perennial subjects
within the Western tradition come out of or respond to Christian dogma (dualism, the freedom of
the will, existentialism, theories of legality, even Algebra [of the Boolean variety]). So long as
neoplatonists like Plotinus, St. Aquinas and St. Augustine, as well as later philosophers like
Descartes, Locke, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche are taught as canon to Western philosophy,
it seems silly to discount the philosophy of other cultures for being in some way connected to that
culture’s religion.
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In A.C. Graham’s seminal work Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical
Argument in Ancient China, it becomes very clear just how “philosophical” the
ancient world was, even outside the context of Greek thought. Before exploring
the dimensions of this work, though, a few preliminary things ought to be said.
First, I have titled this little section “Philosophy on the Asian Continent” because I
do not know if there is a tradition of “Asian philosophy,” though I find it more
likely that there are multiple Asian traditions of philosophy which may or may not
be contextually connected. My personal knowledge is limited to Chinese
philosophy, and so that is the Asian tradition I have chosen to examine. I have
little doubt that a similar chapter could be written about Japanese, Korean, Indian,
and Arabic philosophy as well. Second, as in the section on Africana philosophy,
professors of the Western tradition might be skeptical as to whether Asian thought
has any place within a philosophy classroom — after all, the Greeks, Romans, and
Enlightenment philosophers (the “canon”) were mostly uninfluenced by whatever
debates were going on thousands of miles away. If we include the work of women
and Africana philosophers as well, there still does not seem to be much link to the
Asian continent. This viewpoint against Asian relevance, however, assumes that a
genealogical connection is the only link worth exploring. Against this assumption,
there is no reason to believe that a thematic link between the work of disparate
philosophers is any less relevant to whatever topic is being explored. Much as
Sartre could be pulled into a discussion of Aquinas when discussing human
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fulfillment through reflection on human nature, the ancient Mohist treaty Names
and Objects could be compared and contrasted to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical
Investigations in order to better understand what makes Wittgenstein’s theory
unique, or to appraise the universal accuracy of his work by approaching it from a
non-Western perspective.33
The rest of this section will reveal how influential Chinese thought could
be, much like feminist and Africana thought, if utilized in the classroom. Of most
interest to the Western philosopher are likely the Later Mohists, “a school which
fully shared the Greek ideal of bringing all knowledge within the scope of reason”
(7). Much like in Greece, there was also a school of Sophists contemporary to the
Mohists, who “practice[d] argument for its own sake,” using logic to create wordpuzzles, and absurd conclusions (7). The Later Mohists, however, “took from the
Sophists…the tools for building a logically sophisticated utilitarianism,” a system
of knowledge meant to appeal to universal reason (7). The philosophical
disciplines of the Later Mohists are interestingly similar to the West’s own
branches of philosophy (though with some important differences). They are [1]:
knowledge of names. [2]: knowledge of objects. [3]: knowledge of how to connect
names and objects. [4]: Knowledge of how to act. As similar as these categories
are to our notion of philosophy of language, ontology, and ethics, Graham reminds
us that “although it is sometimes convenient to impose our Western classifications

Graham does just this, concluding a section on Mohist philosophers with “The message of
Names and Objects is more like Wittgenstein’s than Aristotle’s (153).
33
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and say that the Mohist discusses ethics, science, even logic, it is important not to
lose sight of his own fourfold classification of knowledge” (139). While Chinese
philosophy is comparable to Western philosophy, neither is reducible to the other.
That these two traditions have built comparable, though fundamentally different
systems of inquiry is important for the two goals of analysis mentioned above:
better understanding of what makes our Western theories unique, and criticism of
such theories through an awareness of alternative modes of thought.
In case the general description of these Mohists seems too abstract to be of
use, below is a demonstration of how a short lesson on the Mohists could help
elucidate topics in Western philosophy — for example, a lesson on Kant’s system
of knowledge a priori and the Later Mohists understanding of knowledge
‘beforehand.’ Say that students are having difficulty piecing out of Kant’s difficult
language why a common form of human intuition is necessary for mathematics to
be universal. Here, an example from the Later Mohists would be useful: “When
we jump the city-wall the circle ‘stays.’ By the things which follow from or
exclude each other we know beforehand what [the circle] is” (144). Like Kant, the
Mohists think that there must be a reason for why mathematical objects, and
everything else which follows logical principles, remain the same both within
one’s city and beyond it. To do this, the Mohists employ forms of perception
relevant to concepts (like Kant’s categories), and forms relevant to intuitions (like
Kant’s Aesthetic). When experiencing a circle, one needs the conceptual tools
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‘like’ and ‘all,’ as well as the experiential tools ‘straight,’ and ‘center.’ The idea
that something is ‘like’ another is necessary for any experience whatsoever,
insofar as without it “no common name could be understood” (144). From ‘like’
comes ‘all.’ When there are no examples of things unlike one another, they can be
classified as ‘all’ alike. ‘Straight’ is “defined in terms of visual alignment” (144).
Things are straight, and the properties of ‘straight’ never change, because of the
way in which our vision has been constructed. Notice how each of these forms of
perception are tied to formal necessities about human experience. From these
forms, only a few more steps are required to arrive at a definition of circle
according to ‘a priori’ foundations:
(1) “‘Of the same length’ is each along all of the other when straight.”34
(2) “The ‘center’ is that from which lengths are the same.”
(3) ‘Circular’ is having the same lengths from a single center.”
Why is it important to go through this trial of logic? Because we must know
beforehand what the circle is to make sense of the fact that we find circles beyond
our village walls — everywhere. Like Kant, the Mohists discover their explanation
for this in terms of synthetic knowledge a priori, the constitution of human
experience. Unlike Kant, they spend little time focusing on how such knowledge is
possible, but on what such knowledge yields (like the circle). They apply this
same foundational method towards attaining an ethical system which Graham

34

Notice the use of ‘all,’ ‘like,’ and ‘straight’ to construct this definition of ‘same length.’
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describes as akin to utilitarianism. The point here is that there are philosophical
systems on the Asian continent which have important conceptual relationships (if
not genealogical) to Western philosophy.

Diverse Inclusion and Pedagogy: Up until this point, we have shown that nonwhite, non-male research and participation within philosophy is discouraged. At
the same time, we have demonstrated that the inclusion of these perspectives is
possible and desirable, even if only to improve a student’s understanding of the
Western tradition. However, after our analysis of contemporary pedagogy, and the
values intrinsic to Western philosophy, it seems obvious that there are a variety of
additional reasons for including the feminist, Africana, and Asian philosopher
within one’s syllabus.35 Here is a visualisable illustration of potential (and
common) problems within philosophy classrooms, each linked to different values
that philosophy itself possesses.

35

There are other groups which I have left untouched who also have a history of philosophical
analysis, I think particularly of the many indigenous philosophies throughout the Americas and
Australia. More insight into their philosophical work is being discovered every decade through
anthropological investigations as well as contemporary indigenous stewards rediscovering their
heritage, and writing about it.
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In Chapter One of this essay, we uncovered how Western philosophy, as its most
famous and prestigious practitioners have defined it, necessitates emotional
attitudes (like interest), faith in one’s own autonomy and creativity, relevance to
lived life, and a communal methodology. Now, I am suggesting that each of these
‘necessities’ can also be phrased as imperatives teachers commonly confront
themselves with, to which diverse syllabuses are a solution. Following Chapter
One’s section on pedagogy, I hope it is also clear that love for the world and for
one’s subject matter is an important feeling that teachers ought to model, and
inspire in their students as well. I did not include the imperative “I need to find a
way to make my students feel that this world is deserving of their attention, and
love…” because I do not believe that many teachers truly ask themselves this —
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and, if they have, that it is likely they are already teaching a diverse curriculum,
one which truly represents the world. I have chosen to focus on more common
questions, to which the answer of ‘diverse inclusivity’ might seem less obvious.
In order to understand why inclusivity is so helpful, we can refer back to
our analysis of contemporary pedagogy. In order to provoke interesse (or interest)
in a subject, it helps if the students understand that the object of study is
mysterious. If no one has a perfect understanding of it yet, then the student is
encouraged to investigate, and come to their own creative (and informed)
opinions. How better to show that a subject is as yet undetermined than by
exposing the student to different philosophical traditions connected via their varied
analyses of the object in question. Freire would say that interest naturally arises in
students when the material they study is directly connected to their own
experience. For this to be accomplished, we need not only white men, but other
philosophers who have crafted their theories according to diversified experiences
that the students likely share. Similarly, students are encouraged to do philosophy,
or any field of study, when they can visualize role models who possess similar
identities and who have attained success. How should a woman feel that
philosophy suits her when the syllabus suggests it only suits men? Relevance to a
student’s own life has been discussed by Vlieghe and Zamojski and by Freire. The
former tell us that examples of an object of study’s appearance in the world of
each student are “entry points” to understanding. In this sense, the more
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diversified the syllabus, the more opportunities the professor has to construct
diverse entry points. John Locke and Malcolm X both write about the failure of
social contracts, and their renewal, though it should seem obvious that the “entry
points” each provides are different, and very related to social identities. On this
note, Freire tells us that relevance is found when the world is studied, as opposed
to one group’s opinion about the world. If academic education must be about
studying the opinions of others, let’s at least make these opinions diverse, for then
less about the world is hidden from our view.
Finally, there is the fact that philosophy is a communal discipline,
continually being developed upon over time (with the occasional “copernican
revolution”). Students might feel put-off if they believe philosophy to be the
ambiguously ‘educated’ views of certain historical figures. To understand the
truth, that the figures we study are part of a context built by many, would allow
students to feel that their philosophy papers, as opposed to being about some
philosopher, are actually about the world with reference to some philosopher. One
way to make this clear, a strategy encouraged by contemporary pedagogy, is by
philosophizing communally within the classroom: debates, discussions, even
assignments where students are encouraged to talk about philosophy with someone
they know.
To conclude: Western philosophy is a diverse field, and it has useful
connections to other diverse traditions. However, in the classroom, often it is only
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one of its many aspects that are taught. According to pedagogical research, this is
not a successful way of teaching, nor is it authentic to Western philosophy
generally. For this reason, avoidable problems arise for professors of philosophy,
including a lack of interest from students, and general alienation in the classroom.
A diverse inclusivity within the syllabus and methods of teaching have the
potential to solve these problems. What’s more, as I hope to have demonstrated,
the inclusion of non-male, non-white opinions is quite easy and fun.

Contextualizing Philosophy Within the World Through Alternative
Teaching
Whereas in the previous section I looked at a hole in the material taught, in this
section I examine the limited styles of teaching currently mainstream within
philosophy (lecture and discussion), and how such styles, when completely
dominant, make it difficult for students to understand philosophy’s importance
outside of the classroom. I then explore the work of select philosophers who also
recognize the insulatory tendencies of philosophy, connecting their work to
pedagogy. Finally, in the context of their work and Chapter One, I introduce
alternative teaching methods that would be more true to the spirit of a
philosophical pedagogy, and more effective as well.
For much of the 20th century the classic method of teaching philosophy
was through a professor’s lecturing about what they knew, and the students
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synthesizing those lectures with their own readings to answer questions of
clarification: “To what extent is Mill’s utilitarianism hedonistic?” or “Can the
contradictions between Kant’s transcendental deduction and transcendental
aesthetic be reconciled?” Speaking about ethics in particular, Derek C. Bok writes
that “survey courses on moral philosophy…have rarely attempted to make more
than a limited contribution to moral education. Since the classes usually consist of
lectures, they do not develop the power of moral reasoning” (Bok, 27). It is
important to recognize that Bok wrote those words in 1976, though they ring fairly
true today. Especially in regards to the recent research into learning styles
(auditory, visual, tactile, and so on),36 it does not seem so radical anymore to
suggest that more creative modes of teaching, if combined with one’s lectures, will
hold interest better, and help the students retain what is taught. We need not even
mention that lectures, when they take up the high majority of a class’ time, tend to
be non-communal, do not allow the ‘thing’ of study to appear on its own terms,
denigrate the wisdom of students, and thereby discourage the contextualization of
material within student life.
Towards the end of the 20th century, though, discussion-oriented forms of
teaching became popular, specifically with ethics (though it seems to me that the
other forms of philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, etc. remained ‘lecturebased.’). In any case, the new mainstream pedagogy that William Penn Jr means to

36

See “Learning Styles and their Relation to Teaching Styles,” by Hawkar Akram Awla.

Denning 85

critique in his essay “Teaching Ethics — A Direct Approach” is a ‘discussionbased’ class that, for various reasons, seems ineffective. As he says: “The
approach most frequently used at other institutions…is a moral dilemma
discussion model in which the ‘instructor’ facilitates the students’ exploration of
diverse points of view, but does not attempt to teach the higher stage operations
[here referring to Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning]. This approach is based
on the assumption that students can best develop principled moral reasoning if
they discover it for themselves through group discussion” (Penn Jr., 3). One thing
to note is that discussion-based learning is, in some of its qualities, nearly identical
to its lecture-based counterpart: information is still being conveyed auditorily.
What’s more, to say merely that a class is ‘discussion-based’ says nothing about
how the teacher leads these discussions, how the subject is presented to the
students, and so on. In Towards an Ontology of Teaching, it was shown how a
student discussion, when left to its own devices, risks producing opinions as
opposed to knowledge about the object being studied. It is the teacher’s duty to
ensure that the subject of study is visible, or salient to the student, and that all
statements about this subject are justified via reference to the subject itself (an
experience of the subject that others can reproduce).
The goal of Penn Jr.’s essay is to demonstrate something similar, that
discussion isn’t enough on its own, but must be had alongside “practical
understanding of and preference for the perspectives which are the organizing
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elements of principled moral thinking” (5). In other words, there is something that
the professor presents which the students ought to learn about, though their
learning should occur through practical engagement with what is taught, and in
that way, through a unique (a personalized) internalization of the material. Some
alternative modes have already been suggested above (assigning conversations
with non-students to better understand how the subject is understood or misunderstood culturally; using the space of the classroom, or role-playing, to make
the subject appear on its own terms; discussing how the subject might inspire
activism of some kind outside the classroom, and modeling that activism; etc.) and
readers may have already considered their own unique solutions. For now, though,
it is important merely to note that common lecture and common discussion
formats (those which limit themselves to a single technique) are insufficient for a
philosophical pedagogy. They both miss a practical, contextualizing dimension:
the praxis of Freire’s Pedagogy.
Some philosophers have already recognized philosophy’s isolation from the
world beyond its classrooms’ walls. Alternative modes of philosophizing driven
by this realization have been called Field Philosophy, Performance Philosophy,
Public Philosophy, or Borderless Philosophy. Each share a few general goals,
though: to expose non-experts to philosophy, to get outside the university and into
places that would benefit from philosophy (science surveys, political boardrooms,
neighborhood committees, etc.), and to take-up the questions which non-
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philosophers are asking. I will summarize a few papers in which these points are
made, and in the end, relate these methods of philosophizing to our philosophical
pedagogy. First, however, a quote from Friedrich Nietzsche which introduces the
anxieties that field philosophers are attempting to respond to. An anxiety which
should be familiar to readers:

“The dangers for a philosopher’s development are indeed so manifold today
that one may doubt whether this fruit can still ripen at all. The scope and
the tower-building of the sciences has grown to be enormous, and with this
the probability that the philosopher grows weary while still learning or
allows himself to be detained somewhere to become a ‘specialist’: — so he
never attains his proper level, the height for a comprehensive look, for
looking around, for looking down. Or he attains it too late, when his best
time and strength are spent — or impaired, coarsened, degenerated, so that
his overall value judgment does not mean much anymore. It may be
precisely the sensitivity of his intellectual conscience that leads him to
delay somewhere along the way and to be late: he is afraid of the seduction
to become a dilettante…” (Nietzsche, 134).

This quote is used by Robert Froderman to introduce his essay “Philosophy
Dedisciplined.” Froderman wants to show us that philosophers have, just as
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Nietzsche feared, “detained” themselves as specialists. In other words, we’ve
forgotten how “everyone is faced with philosophical questions across the course of
their life” and that this fact “should be reflected in leading philosophy journals”
(1920). I doubt whether many professional philosophers today would disagree that
even the titles of contemporary essays in philosophy have become
incomprehensible to the average person whose experience (or capabilities,
constitution, duties) philosophy is meant to describe. Just today I looked up Mind,
currently on its 522 issue, and the first three essays that confronted me were
● The logicality of language: contextualism versus semantic minimalism
● Minimal fregeanism
● Molinism: explaining our freedom away
Even as someone who has studied academic philosophy for four years, and who is
more sympathetic to philosophy than the general public, I have little idea what
these essays could be referring to. We ought to ask, then: ‘who are we writing to?’
Increasingly, as Froderman points out, we are writing to members of our subfield.
When I write about semantic minimalism, I do not expect for my essay to be read
by many in the continental tradition, nor moral philosophers, nor philosophers of
history. I am speaking mainly to philosophers of language, and specifically those
philosophers of language who are educated in the analytic tradition. This is the
isolation, or insulation of philosophy.37

See also: “In contrast to artistic fields, there is almost no original academic work which is not
presented first to an academic audience, and the vast majority of the work shared within a
37
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We can expect this insulation as the natural conclusion of philosophy’s
becoming a discipline. Just as with the sciences “it is the nature of disciplines to
turn inward: as they develop their work becomes increasingly specialized, and as
specialized they become more isolated from society” (Field Philosophy, 347). For
science the result has arguably been positive, “a steadily growing stream of
innovations that feed the consumer market,” while for philosophy and the
humanities it is unclear what this insulation has accomplished (349). Professional
rigor and autonomy can be counted among its potential benefits, but the
knowledge yielded by this rigor is produced “at a distance — [as] general
knowledge that stands apart from the particularities of individual people and
situations” (347). Familiar to readers by now, this is a shortcoming of academic
philosophy to achieve its own purported values. We can consider its abandonment
of the public sphere as “an abdication of something like half of our philosophical
legacy — think of Socrates, Bacon, and Leibniz as just a few of the philosophers
who took their thinking out into the world” (Philosophy Dedisciplined, 1922). I
need not remind my readers that this kind of specialized exclusivity is inimical to
the values set forward by contemporary pedagogical standards as well: a lack of
“entry points,” personal contextualizations, activism, and communal participation
characterize philosophy as a discipline. My point here is that research within
philosophy is often done without any intention that it be disseminated or

community is never re-presented to a wider audience. The usual academic, in short, writes for
and responds to other members of his own community” (Jones, 2).
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contextualized within people’s lives. If we accept this as a problem, then the
strategies we’ve discovered for contextualizing philosophy within one’s classroom
(as a teacher) could be used by researchers as well: asking questions relevant to
their community’s interests, utilizing the intellectual history of non-white or nonmale groups, finding connections between philosophy and activism, etc. If
philosophy researchers were to use these strategies within their publications, it
would make the professor’s job easier as well. The material they could teach
would have already been written in the spirit of a philosophical pedagogy.
Without this important change, though, the resultant problem for
philosophy has been public irrelevance. This is seen financially, in the defunding
of philosophy across public universities throughout the United States, and also
culturally, in that a great number of people aren’t quite sure what philosophy is
(conversational tricks?). The two are probably related. Field philosophy tells us to
bring our philosophical literature outside, literally, of the university’s campus, and
into public organizations, private industries, groups of friends, and so on.
Essentially, we are asked to take our philosophical beliefs seriously, and live them
out. A teacher might encourage such thinking through role-playing in their class:
one student (or the professor), plays a business leader with some very practical
questions, and the rest of the class are philosophers applying for a job at this
leader’s firm. Answering the question with tact, practicality, simplicity, while at
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the same time maintaining a philosophical rigor would mean becoming hired, and
would also prove the student knowledgeable about the class’ subject matter.
There are other alternatives to discipline-philosophy worthy of analysis as
well. In his essay “How to Escape Irrelevance: Performance Philosophy, Public
Philosophy and Borderless Philosophy,” Robert Hanna proposes solutions to the
problem of disciplinization discussed above. Each will be described:

Performance Philosophy is one alternative to contemporary practice. Along with
(or in lieu of) writing a treatise, Performance Philosophy encourages its
practitioners to express their philosophic point through art, like painting, theatre,
or music. The idea is that through art, which is a public performance of
philosophy, “the contextual criteria of meaningfulness” can be explored — that is,
philosophy can be related to people’s lives far easier (60). What’s more, the
“enigmatic character of philosophy” is manifested within this kind of
performance, something which Towards an Ontology has shown us is important
for fostering interesse (60). Other examples of performance philosophy might
include establishing a community garden encoded with philosophical ideas (‘take
only what you can use, and leave some for the rest of us,’ ~Lockean natural law).
Taking a class to do these things with one’s students is a possibility with much
educative potential.
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Public Philosophy: The Committee on Public Philosophy, sponsored by the
American Philosophical Association, has defined Public Philosophy in a few
different, interrelated ways. In one sense, public philosophy means “doing
philosophy in public spaces and/or engaging the public in the practices of
philosophy” (64). Interpreted another way it could mean philosophizing with “the
explicit aim of benefiting public life,” as public intellectuals might, or Hannah
Arendt’s “‘pearl diver’ who brings sedimented meanings to the surface” (64).
Finally, public philosophy, along the lines of Paulo Freire, could be interpreted as
liberatory “i.e., it should assist and empower those who are most vulnerable and
suffer injustice, particularly through a critical analysis of power structures” (64).
Put another way, if philosophers are those who study truths relevant to real people,
then serious philosophers ought to be scholar-activists who fight for those truths to
be heard and taken up. Unsurprisingly, Robert Hanna concludes that these three
definitions are most successful when taken in tandem: that philosophy ought to be
done in public spaces, with the public good in mind, and towards the liberation of
real folks. Only then does one become a true philosopher, “a rational rebel for
humanity” (72). Practically speaking, we might consider public philosophy done
by union organizers constructing logical arguments to get people on-board or
combat corporate elites (much like Field Philosophy). More humbly, it could also
be realized by a philosopher who has decided to determine their next writing
project according to a survey sent out to the public, and especially so by someone
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who includes quotes from the public in their own work (much like Paulo Freire).
Within the classroom, teaching in the spirit of public philosophy might mean
inviting guest speakers from society-at-large, being hosted as a class by a local
restaurant-owner who’s given the opportunity to share their questions or fears
regarding society, or interviewing members of the public as part of an official
assignment, and integrating these interviews into one’s own opinions about the
studied-philosophy in question.

Borderless Philosophy: One may have noticed by now that Performance
Philosophy and Public Philosophy have quite an overlap. Imagine a philosopheractivist creating street graffiti supporting a philosophically-informed cause — is
this public, or performance philosophy? Both, clearly. For Hanna, Borderless
Philosophy is what happens when we take the other forms of philosophy just
mentioned seriously. To give my readers an idea of what this would be like, I will
quote Hanna at length:

“First [in order to realize Borderless Philosophy], we should get rid of
graduate schools, MA and PhD degrees, and philosophy departments
altogether, and replace them with a network of interlinked borderless
philosophy communities, each one created and sustained by voluntary
association, team-spirit, and a shared sense of real, serious philosophy as a
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full-time, lifetime calling and mission, that combine dialogue, research,
writing, publishing, the creation and sharing of original works of
philosophy in any presentational format whatsoever, teaching, and
grassroots social activism, whose members are widely distributed
spatiotemporally, in many different countries, continents, and time-zones,
and who are therefore also fully cosmopolitan thinkers, doing real
philosophy without borders” (76).

Obviously, this would require quite some change. What interests me about
Hanna’s thinking is his ability to imagine an alternative to our current system of
philosophizing, which gives its practitioners a new ground for analyzing this
current system’s goals, successes, and drawbacks. Because my paper focuses on
improving pedagogical method within academic philosophy, to fully support
Hanna’s pursuit would be somewhat strange. Instead, I would have philosophers
adopt the spirit of Hanna’s words, especially regarding philosophy as “lifetime
calling and mission,” in order to inspire students with the feeling that philosophy
is lived as well as researched. That, I think, is the only way to achieve what
philosophy and pedagogy, what Socrates, Descartes, Friere, Vlieghe, and
Zamojski, have set forward as the goal of our field: studying the world in all of its
contexts, and encouraging others to do the same.
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Diversity, Inclusivity, and Contextualization Altogether
What has this essay (purportedly) accomplished so far? Now is a good time to
reflect on its progress. First, we decided what values a philosophical pedagogy
ought to be founded upon (page 43), and enumerated some means by which these
values could be put into practice. Then we analyzed the real state of the pedagogy
of academic philosophy as it stands today, and discovered that two of its longstanding practices are inimical to the philosophical pedagogy this essay
recommends: First, the practice of discluding minoritized voices (like women,
Africana folks, Asian folks), and second, the practice of teaching without
personalizing what is taught (relying on a single teaching style, and rarely
contextualizing material outside the classroom or inside the student’s own life).
All the while, we have been introducing bit by bit certain practices that could
teach the Discipline of Western Philosophy while engaging students emotionally,
socially, rhetorically, and rationally. Pedagogical practices that are rooted in
philosophy’s own values. What follows is a list of techniques that seem supportive
of a philosophic pedagogy, one organized by the four goals which a philosophy
class ought to accomplish: (1) Fostering a student’s love for people and for the
world. (2) Teaching a student to pursue knowledge efficiently and responsibly,
that is, in dialogue and community with others. (3) Developing a student’s ability
to reason by contextualizing things of study, and by fostering emotional attitudes
like uncertainty, and inspiration. (4) Developing a student’s faculties of autonomy
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and creativity, as well as their ability to construct worldviews. Importantly, we
have discovered that these four missions are connected to diversification of
syllabuses, and greater contextualization of theory. It is my hope that these
examples I provide, despite being organized by goal, manifest some, if not most (if
not all) of the values I’ve just listed.

●

●

●

●

Fostering a student’s love for people and for the world.
Bring in guest speakers from beyond the discipline of philosophy to
comment on what you are teaching the students. Prepare them with a little
context about what students have been studying. Can the guest speaker
relate it to their career, their place in the world?
Have each student draw something which represents the philosophy,
frame them, and find a place within the school to hang them for awhile
(or even in the classroom). Somewhere around the drawings, hang a
summary of the philosophy that is being represented, and have the
students each write beneath their drawing how they feel their work
showcases the philosophy in question. Afterwards, spend half-a-class (or
a full class) letting students invite their friends into the gallery to see the
drawings, and learn about the philosophy too.
Have students give a short speech in front of the class about how some
artwork (TV show, music, movie scene, book, game, etc.) that represents
or instantiates the philosophy being studied.
When students ask questions in class, avoid making definitive judgments
your first response. Instead, use examples from the text or something
representory of the text to let the subject speak for itself. Eventually a
judgment may be useful, though not always.

Teaching a student to pursue knowledge efficiently and responsibly.
● Have the students talk with someone in their life about the philosophy in
question. Do they agree, disagree? Find it hard to understand, or easy?
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Reflect in class about different people’s responses. Did they offer
insights, did they change your mind about the philosophy?
● Diversify the syllabus. On one’s own time, read an introduction to
Africana philosophy, or feminist philosophy, or indigenous philosophy,
and make a list of potential works that could be (whether as brief
references or full focuses) included within one’s syllabus.
● Create graphs, images, mind-maps, or visual representations of what is
being taught. This can be more accessible to some students than pure
lectures. If a philosopher has a web of premises which work together to
support a conclusion, visually represent that with lines connecting the
premises to the conclusion. An example of this is below, in Chapter
Three.
● Be interdisciplinary. Talk with colleagues from other departments about
their perspectives on certain philosophies, and bring those responses into
the classroom. Each individual can only know so much.

Developing a student’s ability to reason through context and emotion.
● At the end of a unit, take students on a walk around campus, asking
interpretive questions about aspects of the world as you pass them. Can
the students use what they know about philosophy to meaningfully
answer those questions. Can the students think of new questions to ask
about the world?
● Use role-playing to act out moments in life where the philosophy is
salient, and makes itself known. To show why some philosophers think
that the self cannot be fixed with permanent descriptions, have two
students carry on a conversation in which they must exemplify a list of
character traits (ones which seem to fit them). If its awkward (as is likely)
talk about how this exemplifies the fluidity of self, that it cannot be
strictly defined.
● Play games that make philosophical lessons memorable and tactile. To
demonstrate the danger of Lockean property law, hide plastic eggs with a
little note attached (“nature”), and have students hunt each egg down,
replacing them with another note (“developed”). Represent the yields of
this land with candy from the eggs. Can the students eat all the candy
they’ve collected, or have they overproduced?
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● In place of an essay or reading, have the students think deeply about what
they’ve learned and journal about it. Depending on the class you can have
them (1): Passively interpret an experience through the philosophy’s lens,
(2): Actively do something inspired by the philosophy, (3): Live a whole
day ‘as if’ they fully believed the philosophy. In their journal (which
might be turned in, or discussed in class), they can reflect on what their
experience tells them about the philosophy. Did it affirm that the
philosophy makes sense, or did it lead to questions that the philosophy
doesn’t have answers for yet.
● Encourage students to think of the philosophy in question as something
living and breathing. They can walk outside and find reasons to believe it,
or deny it.
● If possible, apply to take students on field trips. Go to places that embody
philosophical ideas. If the subject is representation, simulacra, human
rights, or materialism, go to McDonald’s for a spell, and witness firsthand false representations, the negotiations between human rights and
profit, and the value which many people place in material things over
conscious people.

Developing a student’s creative faculties, making worldviews.
● Simulate what the world would look like if everybody took this
philosophy seriously. What does the world look like?
● Instead of an essay which interprets some philosopher, or answers a
teacher’s question about some philosopher, have students write an
original work of philosophy which answers the core questions of the
philosophy being studied. After learning about Kierkegaard, Sartre, and
Dostoevsky can the students write their own existential work? You can
ask them to have their work be partially informed by the studied figures.
● Set a day aside in the mid or late syllabus as empty. Have the students
vote on a particular thing to cover in greater depth that day (question
that’s been asked, idea that was suggested, topic worthy of a deep-dive,
etc.).
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Chapter III: An Example Syllabus (Seven Classes)
What follows are seven classes which would represent the first unit of a
hypothetical philosophy course on natural law and natural rights. At the beginning
of this project, my goal was to complete three units, the first being on John
Locke’s Second Treatise; then Cristina L. H. Traina’s Feminist Ethics and Natural
Law; and finally Vincent W. Lloyd’s Black Natural Law. My goal for the students
taking this course would have been for them to draft their own set of natural laws
and rights as informed by the concerns and methodologies of feminism and
Africana philosophy. What I have to present my reader with is unfortunately not
so lofty: what follows is the first unit of this course, the one focused on Locke.
Within my presentation of Locke I have attempted to manifest much of the theory
and suggestions made up until now within this essay, though I hope that it is read
with an eye towards its fundamental incompleteness. Locke may suffice as an
introduction to natural law and rights, but he is by no means the final word in this
large genre of philosophy. Below you will find brief summaries of each class, as
well as a link to the slides and speaker notes fundamental to these classes’
structures.

Class One: In this class I introduce the idea of natural law through a game.
Students are asked to wonder about what the proper fulfillment of a human person
is. After many different suggestions are given (itself representative of the variety
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of answers provided within this field), we simplify it: one part of the room is made
to represent human fulfillment, and a pathway is made out of tables in order to get
there. These tables represent our construction of a natural law which, by limiting
our freedom, can help us to flourish. Students are then divided into two groups,
ones and twos. Ones are those who decide whether they will follow the path of the
tables (natural law) to arrive at their destination of flourishing — or if they will
not, instead hopping over some tables to take an alternative path (one that is more
fun, more quick, etc.). Twos are hanging out on top of these tables, and if the ones
break natural law in order to flourish, the twos must be pushed over. The idea is to
demonstrate why someone’s decision to follow natural law is an ethical one, and
how natural laws are constructed to ensure that each individual’s human
flourishing is compatible with everyone else’s.
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After this introductory game, I provide the definition of natural law given by
certain historical figures (Locke and Aquinas), and then some very brief examples
of how different systems of natural law compare with one another (using Gustavo
Gutiérrez as a modern example).

I then compare natural law to natural rights, as this course intends to study both. I
argue that rights are translatable into the language of laws, and laws translatable
into rights, and provide examples of such translations. Finally, I conclude with a
timeline of philosophers from Aristotle to contemporaneous figures who have
made some progress within the field of natural law and natural rights. The
homework of class one is to read chapters 2-4 of Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil
Government.
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/16ed0vgnmtIELollnAbbhCjdpjwXSNC2N
frhfnOmqtAo/edit#slide=id.ge18f97a36f_0_395
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Class Two: The goal of this class is to get a baseline understanding of what Locke
is arguing for in his Second Treatise. We begin by organizing Locke’s first few
laws and rights into a visual collection of statements which are either (1) selfevident or (2) justified by something which is self-evident (the Coggle link will
take you to this diagram).

Next, we discuss the three states within which one can relate themselves to other
individuals (Locke’s state of nature, war, and governance). I demonstrate how one
could maintain each of these diverse states by having the students imagine
themselves as European settlers within Pennsylvania, who are in a state of
governance with their fellow settlers, a state of nature with the Lenni Lanape
tribes-people, and a state of war with the slaves they had brought over. Next, we
discuss the argument that Locke makes: he encourages us to join up with other
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people in order to form a state of governance as opposed to a state of nature or war
— and specifically a state of governance under a democracy.

The goal here is to get students considering how systems of natural laws and rights
played a role in justifying our current political enterprise. This argument of
Locke’s is ideal for presenting students with a practical application of this genre of
philosophy (determining how a society should be run). The homework for this
class is not a reading, but to invent their own small system of natural laws and
rights, and to create a brief reflection about whether they see people around them
acting in accordance with the system they’ve made. If everyone did act in
accordance with their system, would the world be a better place? Could they
somehow convince others of their principles, and in so doing improve their
society? Recall that the goal of this course is to inspire students to create their own
complex collection of rights and laws. This is the first step towards that end.
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https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1X-MOGlNVe6mez9gRwhonvpPr5ydf1oKSp4xeEFoXgc/edit#slide=id.ge155658ec4_0_237

Class Three: This class attempts to answer a question hopefully on the minds of
students after class number two, namely: what is Locke’s methodology for
‘discovering’ natural laws, and is his methodology is responsible? First, though,
students are asked to share their homework from last class with one another: did
their systems of law end up being similar, or different? Are they consistent with
one another, or contradictory? These questions encourage students to think about
whether it is possible to feel confident in one’s set of natural laws when
considering the variety of ways people have (and do) put them together. At this
point I introduce philosopher Bernard R. Boxill to the students, and his essay
“Radical Implications of Locke’s Moral Theory: The Views of Frederick
Douglass.” In this essay Boxill examines Locke’s methodology for uncovering
natural laws, and asks whether it falls prey either to racism or elitism. I present
Boxill’s distinction between forms of ‘self-evidence,’ one of which (and the one
adopted by Locke) does not necessitate ready, universal consent. This means that
someone, or a group of someones, must be trusted by the larger society to uncover
which self-evident truths ought to be incorporated into supposedly self-evident
laws. Locke explicitly relies upon the non-laboring, elite class, and therefore nonwhite class, in order to determine these things, an important mark of racism and
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elitism within his methodology (quotes from these slides are taken from “Radical
Implications of Locke’s Moral Theory: The Views of Frederick Douglass,” within
the collection Subjugation and Bondage: Critical Essays on Slavery and Social
Philosophy).
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In class we then model this kind of natural law production through role-playing as
nobles vs. members of the working class, in which both sets of people are given a
complex math equation to solve. The nobles get a full two minutes to solve the
equation, while the working class receives 30 seconds. This is meant to model
Locke’s thinking about the intellectual productivity unemployed nobles’ possess,
while revealing how biased the nobles’ answers my be (after all, it’s not as if the
working class have the time or prestige to double-check the nobles’ work).
Importantly, I suggest that their are other methods by which to create natural law
(more socially inclusive methods) which will be discussed in the course’s second
unit on feminist ethics and natural law.
Next, the class switches over to analyzing Locke’s theory of nominal
essences, in which there is no objective human essence, and therefore no way of
proving who is human and who is not outside of social recognition. Boxill
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wonders whether this theory of Locke’s is in any way supportive of the kind of
racism that labeled Africans non-human. Boxill answers this question in Locke’s
favor, showing how Locke’s distinction between possessing a ‘human essence’
and inclusion within the moral family mirrors the arguments against racism posed
by Frederick Douglass two centuries later.

Finally, I pose questions to my students about their own natural laws. Is their
collection of laws and rights capable of critiquing elitist and racist actions as well
systemic injustices? This is meant to encourage students to think about what needs
critiquing within society while they construct their own philosophical systems.
The homework is to read chapter five of Locke’s Second Treatise: “on property.”
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1deLn50FVUCXkeccqzknlKgKNEvr1MS
bhMvmK9Z8B_1o/edit#slide=id.ge34c9e5ab8_0_100
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Class Four: This class examines the new laws and rights Locke amends his
system with in order to cover our legal relations to property. In order to
understood these new laws, I argue that we must also understood Locke’s
definition of nature (the thing being turned into property), and his historical role as
a beneficiary of American colonization. First, the class discusses what the
conditions are for morally acquiring property: according to Locke, one must
themselves labor upon what they are claiming, there must be some raw material
left over for someone else to do the same, and what is labored upon must be
continually used — not left to rot. I show an updated diagram of Locke’s system
of natural laws and rights (a link to which can be found in slide five). Because
these new laws tend to be religiously inspired in Locke’s writings, the class is
asked to discuss the extent to which these laws could be justified through secular
means as well (I offer some quotes from Locke which open the possibility for
secular interpretations). At this point, because the students have a proficient grasp
of Locke’s new laws, I pose possible applications for them in order to critique
current social practices.
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(The names for these laws are my own, and they are defined alongside quotations
from Locke in my Coggle diagrams linked within the slides, and shown in class).
Now that Locke’s new laws have been covered, and the importance and
practicality of them demonstrated, the class begins to discuss how Locke’s
understanding of nature has affected the construction of his laws. My argument
that I share with the students is that modern environmentalism, and a more
accurate understanding of indigenous practices (which Locke may have thought
left nature fundamentally unused) can help us to critique and improve upon
Locke’s writings.
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And here is a slide demonstrating possible critiques of Locke which follow from
his description of nature as waste-land.

I then cite some additional philosophers who have written about how Locke’s
system of natural laws and his definition of nature may or may not have played a
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role in justifying England’s seizure of indigenous land. In the spirit of these
critiques of Locke, and in similar form to last class’ examination of elitism, I
encourage the students to investigate whether their own systems of natural law
necessitate a view on nature, and whether this view is defensible in reference to
tough environmentalist questions. Students then talk with their partners about how
they could integrate a responsible definition of nature into their natural law
systems. They are encouraged to codify their systems so that they answer
questions like these:

A brief introduction is then given of Locke’s definition of money, and how it
altered methods of acquiring property. Class number five focuses exclusively on
the philosophy of money as it is presented in Locke. Prior to class five, I leave the
students with a few questions to think over which will help the transition into a
class on money be easier (what is the universal ‘consent’ that Locke refers to in
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the world’s adoption of money, and is it consistent with Locke’s other laws?).
Homework for this class is to go out into the world and appropriate something
through one’s labor in alignment with Locke’s configuration of natural laws.
Students also must write a one-page reflection about how their experience
appropriating impacted their understanding of Lockean philosophy: did it truly feel
as though the object one appropriated was their own because they mixed their self
with it through labor, or is that something which Locke suggests that ends up
being alienated from our experience? If we don’t experience it, does it still stand?
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1NrXAapK7KSUlRr1Gv5RDwka9sbnpQg
HDO8iFmeRE1hs/edit#slide=id.ge2c3bd9a9b_0_60

Class Five: This is perhaps my favorite class which I put together. It centers on a
paper by Onur Ulas titled “Enclosing in God’s name, accumulating for mankind:
money, morality, and accumulation in John Locke’s theory of property.” The
purpose of this class is to show how Locke’s definition of nature (something
Christianly inspired as ‘what was given by God for development’) leads to a
capitalist drive towards universal appropriation and development. According to
this reading, money is introduced by Locke into his philosophical system in order
to permit this capitalist drive while circumventing the law that property ought
never to be left for waste. By translating something’s use value into monetary
value, there is no longer any limit towards development so long as one can turn
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what was developed into profit prior to its spoilage (this justifies the capitalist’s
unending production of inevitably unused things, so long as those things are sold).
The class begins by acknowledging that Locke’s fifth chapter of his Second
Treatise reads somewhat strangely. There are two seemingly contradictory
motivations to his outlining of the natural laws of property.

The class explores where within Locke we find these different ideas, and how
strange it is that they exist side-by-side. Ulas’ contribution is to show that these
two elements of Lockean thought actually support one another.
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This last slide represents the role that money plays in overcoming the law of
conservation, which permits things to be developed and owned only insofar as
they are used (and since, without money, there is a limit to how much one person
can physically use, there seemed to be a naturally inspired equality to ownership
prior to the invention of money). Next, we examine whether the unequal
ownership of property resulting from money and capitalist development is
contradictory to any of Locke’s other laws (I provide quotes from Locke showing
how he subtly and ingeniously makes everything consistent). Following this
restatement of Lockean law, I initiate an activity meant to show students in a very
practical way the dangers of producing for profit as opposed to for use: a
collection of plastic eggs have been scattered among the room, each representative
of unused waste land. The activity is an egg hunt, in which students, after finding
an egg, place a slip of paper where the egg used to be that says “developed,”
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meaning that they have turned the land into a factory yard, market, farm, etc. Each
egg has a piece of candy in it, and students accumulate this candy in a bowl in the
center of the classroom after being paid in fake money by the teacher (representing
Locke’s belief that constant development adds to the “stock of mankind.”) After
all the land has been developed, we judge whether all of the candy we’ve
produced can be used (eaten) by our class before it goes bad. A twist, however,
occurs when I dump a whole other bag of candy into our bowl, representing the
way in which developed land continues to produce, constantly, for mankind. The
point is that there is no possible way all of what we’ve produced can be used
without being wasted. This activity is then contextualized in the modern world
through a slide about US food waste, essentially what we had just modeled.

The class concludes with an analysis of Lockean consent. Supposedly, the use of
money was something which ‘the world’ had consented too, but this is a strange
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idea in the face of its divine purport (to make use of land divinely intended for
development) and the fact that un-consenting would mean consigning to waste a
bunch of property which, accordingly to Lockean law, ought not to be wasted.

Homework for this class is to read two short philosophy papers about Lockean
philosophy as applied to race. Both African American philosophers take
contradictory standpoints regarding Locke’s place in the philosophy of race and
government. These papers are Harvey B. Natanson’s “Locke and Hume: Bearings
on the Legal Obligation of the Negro” and Bill E. Lawson’s “Locke and the Legal
Obligations of Black Americans.”
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1fRmE4NxTwVPML0dfoFjuMg6qaEGqn10yik-Lhiof9c/edit#slide=id.ge2eba3f7d6_0_143
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Class Six: The focus of this class is to examine the section of Locke’s natural law
which focuses on forming political bodies. Specifically, this class addresses
whether African Americans should be considered citizens of the United States
(and therefore in a state of governance when related to non-black US citizens) or
non-citizens who were either never provided with a good faith contract for
governmental protection, or were coerced into accepting such a contract (which
would put Black ‘Americans’ in a state of nature or war when related to certain
non-black US citizens). In order to parce how Locke’s philosophy can be weaved
into this discussion I use the works of two African American philosophers who
take contradictory views on the issue: Natanson, who does not believe that Black
‘Americans’ ever consented to being governed, and Bill E. Lawson, who does
believe that Black Americans so consented.
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Because Natanson assumes that his reader has a complex understanding of race
history within the US, and therefore that it is an open question whether African
Americans were provided with a ‘good faith’ contract securing their governmental
protection, I supply my students with some slides depicting historical moments in
race history in order to fill in that assumption.

Denning 120

(The sources of these quotes are provided in the lecture notes of those particular
slides). The purpose of Natanson’s argument is to demonstrate how, from a
Lockean perspective, African Americans are not obligated to follow the laws
crafted within the United States, as they have not consented to be so governed, but
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are subject only to natural laws, which apply to all members of the moral family.
Because Natanson’s argument is so reminiscent of Malcolm X’s speeches from the
1960s, I include some of his ‘Ballot or the Bullet’ speech as well.

I then present a summary of Natanson’s argument:
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At this point, students are invited to role play both sides of a similar argument.
One group represents an oppressed section of people who are using Locke’s and
Natanson’s philosophy to argue for separatism from the state. The second group of
people represents the state itself, which is arguing that the oppressed group of
people are morally obliged to remain within the state (assuming that everything
which held true for the African Americans also holds true for this hypothetically
oppressed group, property destruction, voting restrictions etc.). At the end of the
debate, students discuss which side they believed had the most effective, most
morally grounded argument.38

38

Importantly, though, students are not role-playing as Black Americans, but as people in a
figurative world who have been similarly mistreated.
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Next, we examine Lawson’s argument for considering African Americans
as consensually determined, true citizens of the US. I divide up his arguments into
four sections, each of which are analyzed, and critiqued.

Malcolm X is cited once more during my analysis of Lawson’s four arguments.
Finally, I end the class with a quote from Locke, which makes crystal-clear that
whether someone has been offered a good-faith contract of governmental
protection could only ever be determined by that person. We are our own judges
when it comes to whether our government has fulfilled its purpose in good faith.
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I will also include an image of the homework (not due next class, but the class
after next. Students have two periods to work on it). It involves writing a more
detailed version of one’s own natural laws, incorporating definitions of nature,
humanity, and critiques of social systems.
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https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/161dP9oTY3VmgfFmDsdmJLOsZaw0vV
pdWBwVLQO1gFAI/edit#slide=id.p

Class Seven: This is the final class for the unit on Lockean natural law. Its
purpose is to summarize what we have learned, and address any outstanding
questions we haven’t had time for. The class begins with a 15 minute opportunity
for students to talk with each other about how their work on the last homework
assignment (their own formulation of natural law) has been going. The idea is for
them to inspire each other, and have some time in class to think through their
philosophical system. I provide some leading questions students can ask each
other. Next, we discuss why religion and natural law seem so consistent with one
another. In order to help answer this question, I cite the author of Black Natural
Law.
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It seems that a secular form of natural law would need to propose that their is a
morally binding human nature, but that no divine power intended human nature to
be morally binding. This introduces us to another strange, outstanding question
within natural law: the fact that we are deriving an ought (moral duties) from an is
(our given nature). Since the mid 1900s this has been considered by most Western
philosophers as a logical fallacy. Here is a visual representation of the problem, as
applied to a common natural law (that of fundamental equality).

In order to understand whether any secular theory of natural law could overcome
this fallacy, I introduce a paper by philosopher Lloyd L. Weinreb titled “A Secular
Theory of Natural Law.” Weireb’s idea is that we need a concept of morally
binding rights in order to account for our conceptual difference between things and
persons — a difference which cannot be done away with, as it is structurally

Denning 127

essential to our very experience (students are encouraged to think about whether
that statement is true).

Weinreb fleshes out his list of rights by using the fact that we are rights-bearers as
his starting point. In other words, the rights that must serve as preconditions for
our being rights-bearers become natural rights, and universally binding. I provide
students with the list of rights that Weinreb uncovers. It is my hope that this
encourages students to find value in natural law and rights without any need for
religious preconceptions.
The final element of this unit is a field trip. We all go on a walk outside, on
university grounds together, talking about what we see and whether what we’ve
learned about natural laws and natural rights has affected our understanding of
what we see. I include some example discussion prompts a professor could use
while on such a field trip.
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The purpose of these prompts and this field trip, as was discussed in this essay’s
section on pedagogy, is to get students considering philosophical claims seriously
— to get them feeling that these claims are meant to describe a real thing within
their own lives. This should, if my essay’s theory is correct, increase a student’s
interest in philosophy, and help them to better understand philosophy in the
process.
https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1V7gHok2wKQ9lZHXgcP8lzSnCMLE3X
epgtVEb5rHUjNU/edit#slide=id.ge566424b3f_0_79
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Conclusion
If I have done anything through the publishing of this essay, it is my hope that I
have done this: first, defined philosophy in such a way that traditional
philosophers are satisfied, while also revealing a less common conception of
philosophy, that it investigates objects communally, and that its conclusions, with
some effort, can be contextualized in our lives and made to inspire each of us to
live differently. Second, I believe (I hope) that I have given a summary of
pedagogical research complex enough to warrant respect among readers, if not
agreement — a summary which reveals the benefits of teaching philosophy in the
way philosophy itself asks to be taught, with contextualizations, emotional
appeals, and communal methodologies. Third, although a topic warranting a book
in its own right, I hope to have convinced readers that diversity within philosophy
is limited, both in figures studied and in professors teaching while also (1)
demonstrating why diversity is good for pedagogical and philosophical reasons
and (2) proving that diversity can be incorporated into philosophical subjects with
success. Fourth, I hope to have shown that there are esteemed philosophical
movements which, like myself, are pushing for philosophers to understand their
work in social terms (as socially constructed, or with social ramifications) and
through active contextualizations, like philosophical activism, public projects, or
philosophically inspired private enterprises. Finally, I hope that my readers have
been interested in the ways in which I put my own theories to the test, by creating
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the first unit of a college philosophy class in which these pedagogical and
philosophically strategies are used. In the coming years, it would be a grand
pleasure, the greatest pleasure, to see philosophy classes taught in such a way that
students are compelled to find philosophy present within their own lives and
experience.
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